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THE LIABILITY OF A TRANSFEROR BY DE-
LIVERY AND A QUALIFIED INDORSER
WILLIAM1 E. BRITTON0
IT is the purpose of this paper to discuss the liability of a trans-
feror by delivery and a qualified indorser of negotiable instru-
ments. Questions pertaining to the remedy, the parties to whom
liabilities run, the statute of limitations, measure of damages,
rescission by a creditor against his debtor who has transferred
paper of insolvent obligors in payment of precedent or contem-
poraneous debts, and problems involving the liability of an un-
qualified indorser, as a vendor, are excluded. These aspects of
the general problem will be discussed in separate articles. This
leaves for consideration the question as to the right of such a
transferee to recover from his transferor when the reason for
non-payment by prior parties, or any of them, was because of
some defense, real or personal, or because of the existence of
an outstanding legal or equitable ownership in a third party.1
A word on terminology. The writer has used the word "war-
ranty" throughout this paper not in any restricted or technical
sense but merely as a convenient verbal label for the substan-
tive right of the transferee against his transferor, whether such
light is actually to sue for breach of a teclmical warranty or
to sue for what was parted with as a result of rescission based
on breach of warranty, mistake of fact or otherwise. Also, the
term "transferor" is used to include the transferor by delivery
and the qualified indorser, or indorser without recourse, and to
exclude the transferor who is an unqualified indorser. The term
"vendor" is used as a synonym for "transferor," as above de-
fined. So also is the term "seller" used as a synonym for "ven-
dor" and "transferor." Hence, when the terms "vendor" or
"seller" are used it is not intended to suggest that there is any
difference between selling a bond, for example, and transferring
a note or check of a third party in payment of a precedent or
contemporaneous debt. This question does arise, of course, but
in the section where it is discussed the context makes allow-
Professor of Law, University of fllinois; author of CASES o1 THE LAw
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-The phrasing of the problem discussed in this article makes use of
Professor Chafee's suggestion developed in his excellent paper, Rights in
Overdue Paper (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 1104, and in his edition of
BRANNAN, Tim NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) § 55.
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ance for the variation in usage. The terms "transferee," "ven-
dee," and "buyer" thus take care of themselves.
The paper seeks to do three things: first, to state the com-
mon law on the subject; second, to inquire into the reasons for
results. The courts have used two lines of thought in reach-
ing results. One is drawn from the cases on chattels where
ideas of defect in quality and defects other than of quality-of
description, identity, and the like-are used. This paper criti-
cises this usage, and does so on the basis of the actual decisions
and of judicial opinion. For the opinions themselves, often-
times, will cut througlh this verbiage, even after using it, and
assert simply that a vendor warrants that the instrument is
legally enforceable against all prior parties. It is believed that
this is a just result and a desirable form of statement. There
is one possible extension, the question whether the vendor should
warrant against personal defenses to holders in due course. If
this be added, then, of course, the vendor warrants something
more than the enforceability of the instrument against all prior
parties. This will be discussed. These points come to focus
best in the sections on illegality and personal defenses.
This sort of inquiry leads to the suggestion that the law fix-
ing the liability of the vendor should be perfectly synchronized
with the law which establishes defenses and equities of owner-
ship. If the transferee cannot get his money from any prior
party because that party has a defense, he ought to be able to
get it from his transferor. If the suggested re-phrasing of the
warranty rule is made, he will have a right to get it from his
transferor. There cannot be any "slip-up" here as there is
when the transferor's warranties are said to be that the instru-
ment is "genuine" and "in all respects what it purports to be"-
the language of many common law cases, loose enough even
there, but now, unfortunately, in the Statute. That is, this is
so unless it can be changed. And this is the third object of
this review of the subject, to suggest the amendment of Section
65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law so that it will more clearly
reflect the common law, which, on the whole, produced just re-
sults. Such re-phrasing would serve the further purpose of
rendering results more predictable, settlements quicker, and liti-
gation less likely. This accounts for the organization of the
subject around the specific real defenses, and the separate con-
sideration of warranties against personal defenses.
Forgery
A transferor by delivery is liable to his transferee if the in-
strument is forged. As stated in an early American case:
"When a person sells a note he is always understood as affirm-
ing that it is what it purports to be; that is, that it is a genuine
[Vol. 40
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note. If it is not what it purports to be it is nothing, and may
be treated as a nullity; and it is not material whether it be
given in payment of an antecedent debt, or in exchange for
goods immediately sold and delivered, or to be sold and delivered
at a subsequent day. In the first case it would be no payment;
in the second and third cases there would be a total failure of
consideration; and the party who had parted with his property
in expectation of a consideration which has failed, may resort
to his original cause of action.. . . No one who purchases a
note ever thinks of taking upon himself the risk of its being
a forgery."2
Numerous cases, of course, support this proposition.3
A forged acceptance of the drawee has the same effect on the
liability of the transferor as does that of a maker's name. In
the leading English case of Guivney v. Womcrsley,4 the plaintiff,
who discounted a bill on which the drawer's and acceptor's
names were forged, recovered from his transferor. Lord Camp-
bell said: "I am of opinion that though the defendants, by not
indorsing or guaranteeing the bill, preserved themselves from
warranting the solvency of any of the parties, yet they did un-
dertake that the instrument was what it purported to be." - It
was argued for defendant, that "the defendants should be taken
to warrant only those things within their own knowledge." 1
The court does not discuss this point, though recovery was al-
lowed, there being no disclosure of evidence that the defendant
knew of the forgery. And Coleridge, J., added: "The vendor
of a specific chattel, it is not disputed, is responsible if the arti-
cle be not a genuine article of that kind of which the seller
2Semmes v. Wilson, Fed. Cas. No. 12, 658 at 1061 (1837). Or, as stated
in Lyons v. Miller, 6 Grat. 427, 440 (Va. 1849): "By declining to endorse,
the defendant . . . could not . . . avoid the responsibility of warranting
the genuineness of the instrument'
3 Dana v. Angel, 1 Hawaii 319 (1855); Bell v. Cafferty, 21 Ind. 411
(1863); Waller v. Staples, 107 Iowa 738 (1898) (forged mortgage);
Snyder v. Reno, 38 Iowa 329 (1874); Smith v. McNair, 19 Kan. 330
(1877); Cluseau v. Wagner, 126 La. 375, 52 So. 547 (1910); Thompson v.
McCullough, 31 Mo. 224 (1860); Hunt v. Sanders, 288 Mo. 337, 232 S. W.
456 (1921) ("immaterial whether defendant knew or did not know the
paper was forged;" under N. I. L.); Herrick v. Whitney, 15 Johns. 240
(N. Y. 1818); Shaver v. Ehle, 16 Johns. 201 (N. Y. 1819); Lyons v.
Diveibis, 22 Pa. 185 (1853); West Philadelphia National Bank v. Field,
143 Pa. 473 (1891); Barton v. Trent, 3 Head. 167 (Tenn. 1859); Lyons v.
Miller, suprau note 2.
The same result has been reached where the instrument is signed by
one having no authority to bind the principal. Swanzey v. Parker, 50 Pa.
441 (1865); Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. 482 (1868). Contra: First National
Bank v. Drew, 191 Ill. 186, 60 N. E, 856 (1901), criticised in 1 WILISTON,
CoNTAcTs (1920) § 445, n. 6.




represents it to be. And the question raised really is, What is
the extent of the want of genuineness for which he is respon-
sible? Without laying down the limits, it is clear to me that
this case fell much within them." 7
An indorser without recourse, just as the transferor by de-
livery, is liable to his indorsee if the maker's name was forged.,
The implied warranty of genuineness, thus worked out by
the common law cases, is codified by Section 65 of the Negoti-
able Instruments Law. This Section provides: "Every person
negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorse-
ment, warrants,- (1) that the instrument is genuine and in
all respects what it purports to be." 9 The typical situations,
as they appear in the preceding common law cases, should be
held the same under Section 65 simply by interpreting and ap-
plying the first clause, i.e., the warranty "that the instrument
is genuine." Thus far, there would be no necessity for making
use of the warranty that the instrument is "in all respects what
it purports to be"=-an expression which, as indicated in the
above cases, was frequently used at common law. The corre-
sponding language of the English Bills of Exchange Act is set
out in the note. 0
Fraiud as a Real Defense
Is an instrument forged, i.e., not genuine, within the meaning
of the above rule, when the signature was affixed, not by a third
party, but by the party whose name is signed, under circum-
stances where he did not know the character of the instrument
which he signed, and was not negligent in not finding out? '
71bid. 140, citing Jones v. Ryde, 5 Taunt. 488 (1814). See infra note 26.
8 Palmer v. Courtney, 32 Neb. 773, 49 N. W. 754 (1891) ; Hall v. Lati-
mer & Son, 81 S. C. 90, 61 S. E. 1057 (1908).
9 Cluseau v. Wagner, 126 La. 375, 52 So. 547 (1910); Hunt v. Sanders,
288 Mo. 337, 232 S. W. 456 (1921).
30 § 58 provides: "(1) Where the holder of a bill payable to bearer
negotiates it by delivery without indorsing it, he is called a 'transferor by
delivery.' (2) A transferor by delivery is not liable on the instrument.
(3) A transferor by delivery who negotiates a bill, thereby warrants to
his immediate transferee, being a holder for value, that the bill is what it
purports to be, that he has a right to transfer it, and that at the time of
transfer he is not aware of any fact which renders it valueless." The
English Act makes no special provision for the liability of the qualified
indorser, but it is possible that his liability would be controlled by § 58.
A qualified indorser is not really an indorser; the words used simply de-
stroy his liability as an indorser. Not being an indorser, he would be
whatever the Act chose to call him. And in the English Act, he may
thus be called a transferor by delivery.
1 When the maker is negligent in not finding out what he is signing
his signature is genuine and he is liable upon it. Foster vi MacKinnon,
L. R. 4 C. P. 704 (1869). The rule is generally followed in America.
[Vol. 40
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No cases have been found on this point. It is believed that the
vendor of such an instrument would be liable. The instrument
is no more genuine than in the typical case of forgery-assum-
ing of course that the signer was not negligent in so signing.
Inasmuch as the distinctions drawn in Foster V. MacKinnon
and the American cases,' as to the liability of the maker when
negligent, are likely to be observed under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, 3 it would seem that where the signer is held not
liable, the instrument would be held "not genuine" under Sec-
tion 65, and the transferee could recover. This result, however,
could be reached under the Statute in another way. Since the
signature was put there by the party himself it could be said
to be "genuine," ignoring intent as an element thereof. But
the defense may none the less be held real, i.e., good as against
holders in due course-the situation being discussed-although
in that case it would not be called forgery but fraud in the in-
But that phase of it -which frees the maker from liability in cases of non-
negligent execution has been repudiated in West Virginia and, possibly,
Connecticut. Tower v. Whip, 53 W. Va. 158, 44 S. E. 179 (1903); Bank
of Parkersburg v. Johns, 22 W. Va., 520 (1883); Rowland v. Fowler, 47
Conn. 347 (1879). The American cases are collected and discussed in an
article by the present writer, Fravd in the Ihceptimz of Bills and Notes
(1924) 9 CORN. L. Q. 138.
As to what constitutes negligence the cases seem to decide that where
the signer is not able to read, because of illiteracy, defective vision, or
otherwise, there being no third party present or readily available, the
signer will not be negligent in relying upon a statement of the adverse
party as to the contents of the writing signed by him; but if a third
party is present or readily available, who is not associated with the ad-
verse party, the maker will be negligent if he does not request such third
party to read the contents of the instrument to him. Where such signer
is able to read and does not do so but relies upon the statement or pur-
ported reading by the adverse party, he will be deemed negligent.
The cases do not make clear just what it is that a signer must know
before he has "contractual intent." Sometimes he may sign an instrument
not knowing that he is signing that piece of paper at all, as, for example,
when he signs a receipt and by the fraudulent and artful use of carbon
paper his signature is traced on a note. There is no contractual intent
here. An illiterate person signs what he is told is a contract employing
him. There is frequently no contractual intent in such case. On the other
hand, he would have contractual intent although he did not know the law
of bills and notes. Probably what is meant is that he must know, or
had he read could have known, that he was making a promise or order
to pay money. As a practical matter such fact can be determined, how-
ever puzzling the theoretical aspect of the problem may be.
12See supra note 11.
13 Lewis v. Clay, 67 L. J. Q. B. (N. s.) 224 (1897); Foster v. MacKinnon,
supra. note 11, still law in England and followed in Alloway v. Hrabi,
14 Man. L. R. 627; Royal Bank v. Wannamaker, 4 D. L. R. 999 (Ont. 1929) ;
also followed, since the Negotiable Instruments Law, but not cited, in
First National Bank of Shenandoah v. Hall, 169 Iowa 218, 151 N. W. 120
(1915), and in Bothell v. Miller, 87 Neb. 835, 128 N. W. 628 (1910).
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ception, or fraud in the factum, or anything else to distinguish
it from that kind of fraud which operates only as a personal
defense. The only difficulty here is to find the statutory basis
for such a real defense. The Negotiable Instruments Law ex-
pressly deals with the real defenses of forgery, material altera-
tion, and non-delivery of an incomplete instrument, but does
not deal specifically with the real defense based on fraud or
illegality. The Wisconsin 14 and Illinois 1 Acts expressly pre-
serve the real defense arising from the kind of fraud under
discussion. A separate statute in Minnesota 10 probably accom-
plishes the same result. In other states, the defense is either
not real, or will have to be worked out as such, first, by so
interpreting Sections 55 and 57 that this kind of defense does
not fall thereunder and become personal, and second, by treat-
ing it as a casus omissus, and hence controlled by the common
law rule, incorporated by reference into the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law through Section 196. If this course were followed,
then the last clause of Section 65 would apply to create the
warranty, since the instrument, being subject to a real defense,
would not be "in all respects what it purports to be." For,
whatever the outer limits of the meaning of this language may
be, it would seem at least to impose a warranty against all
real defenses so closely allied to that of forgery. On the whole,
however, it would seem more logical and desirable to treat this
kind of real defense as forgery. An instrument so signed can-
not be considered "genuine."
There is another solution, erroneous and undesirable, it is
believed, but perhaps possible under the Act. If such an instru-
ment is deemed "genuine," and the clause "in all respects what
it purports to be" is deprived of all meaning and treated as a
repetition of the idea of genuineness, then the instrument might
be called "invalid." The warranty against facts constituting
invalidity is governed by Section 65(4). And herb the only
warranty defined is, that the vendor "has no knowledge of any
fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or ren-
der it valueless." The answer to this solution has already been
made. If there is -a warranty against the real defense of forgery,
there should be a warranty against any other defense which
operates as forgery.
Certain analogous situations may be referred to in passing,
but not for discussion at this time. This has been done else-
where. 17 It is here intended to exclude the Price v. Neal prob-
14 By addition to § 55 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
15 By express incorporation of an older statute in § 57 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
16 Mi N. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 6015.
17 Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1891) 4 HARV. L. REV. 207;
[Vol. 40
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lem-the question as to when a drawee or acceptor of a bill
bearing the forged signature of the drawer may recover from
the transferor-also, to exclude consideration of the right of
such parties to recover money paid out on instruments bearing
forged indorsements, or on materially altered instruments, or
on genuine instruments accompanied by forged bills of lading,
or on genuine bills of drawers who had no funds with the
drawee. In these cases the instrument is transferred for final
payment. In the cases under discussion the transfer involved
does not end the life history of the instrument. The only oc-
casion for mentioning these problems at all is to point out a
twilight zone between them and the subject of this paper.
Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a transferee, who,
in a sense, is in an anomalous position, should be put in the one
class or in the other. Specifically, where an instrument is drawn
on D, but made payable at bank X, and X takes up the instru-
ment, in which class does X belong? 18 A similiar situation
Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1926) 24 MICH. L. Rcv. 809; BnAN-
NoN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 62.
3s Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taunt. 76 (1815), where a bill drawn on A, pay-
able at the plaintiff's bank, was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant under
A's forged acceptance. The plaintiff could not recover. He was not con-
sidered as a transferee but was held to be in the same position as the
acceptor, so that Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762), controlled. The court
said: "If an acceptor is then bound to know the drawer's handwriting,
is it less the duty of a banker to know the handwriting of his customer?"
Ibid. 81. One judge thought that Jones v. Ryde, supra note 7, should con-
trol. And cf. Fuller v. Smith, 1 Car. & P. 197 (1824), which might be con-
sideied contra.
In Cocks v. M11asterman, 9 B. & C. 902 (1829), it was apparently assumed
that the bank at which the bill was made payable by the acceptor could
recover from the party to whom payment was made under the forged ac-
ceptance of the drawee. But in this case recovery was denied because
notice of the forgery was not given to the transferor until the day after
payment. This point of course has an important bearing on the Price v.
Neal problem. But the court did not refer either to Price v. Neal or Smith
v. Mercer, though both c6ses were cited in argument. The case was fol-
lowed in London & River Plate Bank v. Bank of Liverpool, [1896] 1 Q. B. 7.
The rule was not applied in Leeds & County Bank v. Walker, L. R. 11
Q. B. D. 84 (1883), because the altered instrument there -was a bank of
England note and the holder was prejudiced because there were no in-
dorsers. Nor was it followed in Imperial Bank of Canada v. Bank of
Hamilton, [1903] A. C. 49, a case of an altered check. Here the giving of
notice did not bar the drawee's right of recovery because the court found
there were no indorsers. Nor was the defendant prejudiced as against
the drawer because it was he who had raised the check after certification.
Whether a bank at which a forged note is made payable can recover
from the last holder will depend on the interpretation of § 87 of the Negoti-
able Instruments Law which provides generally that such an instrument "is
equivalent to an order on the bank to pay the same for the account of the
principal debtor thereon.' As tending to deny recovery, see Citizens Bank
v. Schwartzchild & S. Co., 109 Va. 539, 64 S. E. 954 (1909). As tending
19301
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arises where an acceptor or payor for honor takes up the in-
strument.19 Is such party in the position of the drawee, or is
he to be treated as an ordinary transferee who is in no way
a payor? There may be other situations of similiar nature.20
Counterfeit Bank Bills
Transfers of counterfeit coins and bank bills are subject to
the same general rule as that which governs forged paper of
private persons. Coke once expressed the opinion that the trans-
feree of coins assumed the risk of their being counterfeit,-"
and on the basis of this statement it has been argued that the
transferee of counterfeit bank bills assumed the same risk.
Chancellor Kent, however, instead of following the implication
from Coke's dicta, went to the Roman and French law for the
rule which throws the risk on the transferor.2 2
to support the right of recovery, see Mt. Morris Bank v. Twenty-third
Ward Bank, 172 N. Y. 244, 64 N. E. 810 (1902).
19 A payor for honor of an indorser of a forged bill was allowed to re-
cover in Wilkinson v. Johnson, 3 B. & C. 428 (1824). The plaintiff relied
on Jones v. Ryde, supra note 7, and Bruce v. Bruce, 1 Marsh. 165 (1814).
The defendant relied on Price v. Neal and Smith v. Mercer but the court
thought the case was like Bruce v. Bruce. But an acceptor for honor of the
drawer of a bill bearing the forged signature of the drawer was hold
liable to the holder in Phillips v. Im Thurn, L. R. 1 C. P. 463. (1860).
In Goddard v. The Merchants Bank, 4 N. Y. 147 (1850), a payor for honor
of the drawer, the drawer's name being forged, was allowed to recover.
The court took the case out of the Price v. Neal rule solely on the nar-
row ground that payment was made by the plaintiff who had not seen the
bill. Two judges dissented. The distinction resting on the fact that pay-
ments are made without seeing the bill was criticized in Bernhelmer v.
Marshall, 2 Minn. 61 (1858), and Johnson v. Bank, 27 W. Va. 343 (1885).
20 For example, State v. Merchants National Bank, 145 Minn. 322, 177
N. W. 135 (1920) ("payment" by state depositors of bills drawn by and
on state agencies).
21 In Wades case, 5 Coke 114, Coke said: "And it was said that it was
adjudged between Vane and Studley, that where the lessor demanded rent
of his lessee according to the condition of re-entry, and the lessee paid
the rent to the lessor, and he received it; and put it in his purse, and
afterwards looking it over again at the same time, he found amongst the
money that he had received some counterfeit pieces, and thereupon he re-
fused to carry away the money, but re-entered for the condition broken:
and it was adjudged that the entry was not lawful; for when the lessor
had accepted the money, it was at his peril, and after that allowance he
shall not take exception to any part of it." The same idea is found in
SHEPHERD, ToucHSTON. 140.
22 Markle v. Hatfield, 2 Johns. 455 (N. Y. 1807), where Chancellor Kent
criticises the statements of Coke as "ancient dicta in the English law." Of.
also Ramsdale v. Horton, 3 Pa. 330 (1846): "Payment in counterfeit notes
or base coin, is, in effect, no payment at all; and as the debt remains, the
creditor's recourse for it is to the debtor on the original cause of action."
Accord: Union National Bank of Chicago v. Baldenwick, 45 Ill. 375 (1867) ;
Keene v. Thompson, 4 G. & J. 463 (Md. 1832); Buck v. Doyle, 4 Gill 478
222 [Vol. 40
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Return of the counterfeit bill within a reasonable time after
discovery of its invalidity has been held a condition precedent
to the liability of the transferor. 2 3 But there are cases to the




Lack of genuineness results from material alteration as well
as by forgery of the name of a primary party. In the leading
English case of Jones v. Ryde,21 the transferee of a government
navy bill issued for 884 £. and fraudulently raised to 1884 9.
was allowed to recover from his transferor 1000 £.-the 884 .
having been voluntarily paid to him by the government-in an
action for money had and received. The defendant had no
knowledge of the alteration. Replying to the argument that
the defendant, not having indorsed, was not liable, Gibbs, C. J.,
said:
"This question was much mooted in Fennq v. Harisn,27 and
it is true to a certain extent, viz.-if he who negotiates it does
not indorse it, he does not subject himself to that responsibility
which the indorsement would bring on him... but his declining
to indorse the bill does not rid him of that responsibility which
(Md. 1846); Hargrave v. Dusenberry, 9 N. C. 326 (1823); Anderson v.
Hawkins, 10 N. C. 568 (1825); Lowe v. Weatherley, 20 N. C. 212 (1839);
McDonald v. Allen, 67 Tenn. 446 (1874); Chalmers v. Harris, 22 Tex. 265
(1858); Reeves v. Avina, 201 S. W. 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (counter-
feit Mexican money); Pindall's E%'ors v. The Northwestern Bank, 7 Leigh
617 (Va. 1836); Cassedy v. Williams, Fed. Cas. No. 2501 (C. C. D. C.
1843).
-3Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill 340 (N. Y. 1844) (delay of about two months
barred rescission); Lawrenceburg National Bank v. Stevenson, 51 Ind. 594
(1875) (delay of a year barred recovery); Simms v. Clark, 11 Ill. 137
(1849); Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. 181 (1810).
24 Kent v. Bornstein, 12 Allen 342 (Mass. 1866); Perley v. Balch, 23 Pick.
283 (Mass. 1838). "In Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Met. 547 [Mass. 1840] ...
the promissory note was not worthless, for while the indorsements upon
it were forged, the signature of the maker was genuine." Brewster v. Bur-
nett, 125 Mass. 68, 70 (1878).
25A delay of two months was excused in Burrill v. The Watertown Bank
& Loan Co., 51 Barb. 105, 112 (N. Y. 1867), where Morgan, J., after refer-
ring to Thomas v. Todd, supra note 23, said: "I am not satisfied that the
law creates an absolute duty upon the creditor to return forged bank paper
to his debtor before he is allowed to sue him upon an implied warranty of
genuineness." The rule is discussed in Kenny v. First National Bank of
Albany, 50 Barb. 112 (N. Y. 1867).
26 Supra note 7; followed in Bruce v. Bruce, supra note 19.
27 3 T. R. 757. Cf. First National Bank v. Gridley, 112 App. Div. 398, 98




attaches on him for putting off an instrument as of a certain
description, which turns out not to be such as he represents it.""
This case was followed and relied upon in Leeds & County
Bank v. Walker, 2where a transferee who had received Bank of
England notes, altered as to number and amounts, in payment
of his obligation held by the transferor was allowed to recover.
The additional argument for the defendant, that the plaintiff
should not recover because of his delay of five days in giving
the defendant notice of the Bank of England's refusal to pay the
notes, was rejected. The court recognized that failure to give
notice of dishonor either of a forged bill, such as in Cocks V.
Mastermn,30 or of a genuine bill, such as in Cormidge v. Al-
lenby,81 would bar a transferee's right of recovery from his
transferor. But it was thought that such cases did not apply
"to a forged Bank of England note upon which no other person
could be liable except the bank itself and in the case of which
there is nothing to prevent the person sued for the money paid
in error from suing the person to whom he may have given
cash in error, and so on ad infinitum, subject only to the statute
of limitations." American cases are in accord.2
A question of the amount of recovery may be involved. In
the United States, at common law, when the alteration was not
fraudulent recovery could be had in some states on the instru-
ment as it was prior to alteration. In others recovery was al-
lowed on the original debt. Where the alteration was fraudu-
lent no recovery could be had, either on the instrument as it
was prior to alteration or on the original consideration." At
common law, therefore, the damage to the holder depended on
whether the alteration was fraudulent or innocent. If fraudu-
lent the loss was the total value of the consideration paid by
him. If innocent, it was this value less what he could recover
from the maker, drawer or acceptor. And it would seem from
Jones v. Ryde that even if such party voluntarily paid the
amount of the original debt, waiving the defense of alteration,
28 5 Taunt. at 492.
29 Supra note 18.
30 Supra note 18.
3' 6 B. & C. 373 (182'7).
82 Snyder v. Reno, supra note 3, at 333: "Such material alteration ...
is forgery, both at common law and under our statute. And we have
no doubt that there is an implied warranty of the transferer that there
is no such defect in the instrument, as well as that the signature of the
maker is genuine." Accord: Birmingham National Bank v. Bradley, 103
Ala. 109 ,(1893) (indorser "warranted . . . the amount [which had been
altered] expressed in the check").




the amount of the holder's recovery from his transferor would
be cut down to this extent.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law distinctions between
innocent and fraudulent alterations are apparently abolished.
Section 124 provides: "Where a negotiable instrument is mate-
rially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it
is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, au-
thorized, or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indors-
ers." If under this Section holders not in due course cannot
recover, either upon the instrument or original debt, where the
alteration is innocent, it would seem that the vendor would be
liable for the full consideration paid to him by the vendee, ex-
cept where the vendee was not a holder in due course because
he knew of the alteration, in which case there would be no
warranty. But as regards the rights of a holder in due course,
Section 124 provides: "But when an instrument has been ma-
terially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due course,
not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof
according to its original tenor." Whether innocent or fraudu-
lent, this right of the holder in due course would reduce the
amount recoverable from his transferor or indorser without
recourse.
Section 65(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is be-
lieved, imposes the warranty against prior material alterations.
If the material alteration creates a real defense, available
against holders in due course, to the extent above indicated, to
that extent the instrument is not "genuine." Nor is it "in all
respects what it purports to be." The common law cases quite
commonly use the word "forgery" to describe material altera-
tions. Such an instrument therefore could not be "genuine,"
as the term is used in Section 65(1), and there would probably
be no need to resort to the last clause of the Section for the
statutory basis for the warranty against material altera-
tions.34
If the instrument has been altered, not by erasures and sub-
stitutions, but by the insertion of words and figures in blank
spaces negligently left by the maker or drawer in a completed
instrument-the Young v. Grote 3' problem-the liability of the
vendor would turn on the question whether such negligence
operates to estop the maker or drawer from setting up the de-
fense of material alteration as against the holder. At common
law there was a conflict of authority on this point. In some
3 Alterations not material do not create defenses. As to wbat altera-
tions are deemed material see WIiSTON, op. cit, supra note 23, at § 1902
et seq.
3-54 Bing. 253 (1827).
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states the holder in due course was allowed to recover. The
majority held otherwise.30
The Negotiable Instruments Law unfortunatoly does not deal
with the effect of negligent execution. The conflict can thus
continue under the Act. Under Section 65(1) it would seem
that wherever the holder in due course could not recover free
from the defense of material alteration his vendor would be
liable to him, such an instrument not being "genuine." In other
jurisdictions, where the holder in due course may be allowed
to recover from the maker or drawer, he could not recover from
his transferor as the instrument would be "genuine" under Sec-
tion 65 (1). This result is on the theory that a vendor merely
warrants the existence of such facts as will enable his vendee
to recover from the maker, drawer or acceptor. If he warrants
against the existence of personal defenses, even to holders in
due course, a question discussed later, the result would, ob-
viously, not turn on the question whether or not the vendee was
a holder in due course. If the vendor warrants against personal
defenses, then in both cases the instrument would not be "gen-
uine" under Section 65 (1).
Non-detiveryj
No cases have been found which deal with the question whether
the vendor warrants that the instrument is not subject to the
defense of non-delivery. There is little reason to doubt that
he would so warrant if the defense is real. Another question
enters if it is personal. At common law the non-delivery of an
incomplete instrument was a real defense."' And most courts
held that the non-delivery of a completed instrument was also
a real defense.- But it was also held that the non-delivery of a
completed instrument was a personal defense,30 even when the
instrument got into circulation by larceny. And some courts
held that the defense was real if it got into circulation through
no negligence of the maker or drawer, but was personal if his
negligence contributed to its escape. 40
The Negotiable Instruments Law codified the common law
rule on incomplete instruments by making such facts a real de-
fense. Section 15 provides: "Where an incomplete instrument
has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated,
30 The cases are cited and discussed in an article by the present writer,
Negligence in the Law of Bills and Notes (1924) 24 COL. L. RIlv. 695.
2TBaxendale v. Bennett, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 525 (1878); Nance v. Lary, 5
Ala. 370 (1843).
s Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415 (1870).
39 Clarke v. Johnson, 54 l. 296 (1870).
40 Salley v. Terrill, 95 Me. 553, 50 Atl. 896 (1901); Phillips v. Joy, 114
Me. 403, 96 Atl. 727 (1916).
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without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder,
as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before
delivery." But with respect to the non-delivery of a completed
instrument, the contrary was provided, thus codifying the mi-
nority rule. Section 16 declares, with respedt to completed in-
struments, that "where the instrument is in the hands of a
holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties
prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed."
It is clear, therefore, that non-delivery of a completed instru-
ment is always a personal defense. It is not a real defense even
where the maker was not negligent in his custody of it after
execution. It is clear also that the non-delivery of an incomplete
instrument will always be a real defense, unless the courts
should read into Section 15 the qualification that a maker or
drawer who was negligent in the custody of the instrument
after partial execution was estopped to set up the defense of
non-delivery, just as some courts have held that by negligent
execution, contributing to a subsequent alteration by insertions,
a maker or drawer is estopped from setting up the defense of
material alteration as against the holder in due course 1
The basis for the assumption that, at common law, the vendor
warranted against the real defense of non-delivery of an incom-
plete instrument, and of non-delivery of a completed instru-
ment, where that rule obtained- is that the law made delivery
just as important a requisite to the existence of the contract as
was that of execution. If the vendor warranted against forgery,
it was because the instrument so sold never was the maker's,
drawer's or acceptor's contract. Where there was a genuine
signature but no delivery, it was still not the signer's contract.
It would seem that the vendor would necessarily warrant against
this real defense. Discussion of the question as to whether
there was a warranty against the defense of non-delivery when
that defense was personal, or when, though real, there was an
estoppel by negligence to set it up, is postponed.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is believed there
is also a warranty against the defense of non-delivery of an
incomplete instrument. Section 15 declares that, in such situa-
tion, it is not "a valid contract in the hands of any holder."
Section 65 (1) provides, that there is a warranty "that the in-
strument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be."
4 1 Some courts will apparently treat the defense as real, irrespective of
negligence. Holzman, Cohen & Co. v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N. Y.
Supp. 211 (1st Dep't 1916); Linick v. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265,
125 N. Y. Supp. 93 (2d Dep't 1910). Others will not. Phillips v. Joy,
supra note 40; Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan Co., 192 Mo. App.
476, 182 S. W. 777 (1916).
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It might be possible to say that an incomplete instrument stolen
from the maker or drawer was not a "genuine" instrument
within the meaning of this Section. But if such instrument, for
purposes of argument, is admitted to be genuine, the last clause
would impose the warranty, for certainly an instrument which
"is not a valid contract in the hands of any holder," is not "in
all respects what it purports to be." This clause was doubtless
inserted to cover just such cases, situations too numerous to
mention in detail in the Statute, but, in legal effect, analogous
to non-genuine instruments. What does such an instrument "in
all respects purport to be?" If in addition to the content of
the word "genuine," this clause means anything at all, it means
that there is a warranty that the instrument is then an en-
forceable legal obligation of the parties whose names appear
thereon. What else can it purport to be? 12 The narrowest
meaning would be that there is a warranty that the instrument
would be an enforceable legal obligation against prior parties,
in the hands of this vendee. On this construction, if the vendee
were a holder in due course, there would be no warranty against
the defense of non-delivery of a completed instrument, or of
the defense of non-delivery of an incomplete instrument where
there was held to be an estoppel by negligence to set up such
defense, because the vendee could recover from prior parties.
The widest meaning would be that it was warranted to be the
enforceable legal obligation of all prior parties in the hands of
any holder, whether in due course or not, so long as he did not
know of this defense. On this construction the holder in due
course could elect whether to recover from primary parties, or
whether to hold his vendor. Discussion of this question is post-
poned. It is fairly clear at this point that at least there is a
warranty against the defense of non-delivery of an incomplete
instrument when this defense is real.
Incapacity
If a transferor by delivery and an indorser without recourse
assume the risk of forgery of a primary party's name, of mate-
rial alterations, and of non-delivery of incomplete instruments,
42 Of course, if all defenses, real and personal, are to be classified as de-
fects of lack of identity or defects of quality-terms taken from the cases
on chattels-then it might be said that the instrument did not purpor to
be of any particular "quality." There would then be abundant opportunity
for disagreement as to when the particular defect was of quality or of
lack of identity. This classification is not feasible or desirable with respect
to bills and notes as a means of describing the defenses against which
there are warranties, and defenses against which there are no warranties.
If the term "defect in quality" is to be used at all it should be used merely
to describe an enforceable legal obligation which could not be collected
from the obligor because of his insolvency or otherwise.
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it would seem that they should also assume the risk that prior
parties had capacity to contract. And such is the rule. The
vendor warrants against the defense of incapacity, such as in-
fancy, 3 coverture " and insanity.3  While the real defense of
incapacity is not specifically dealt with in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law except by implication in Section 22, dealing only
with the contracts of infants and corporations, the above rule
is definitely codified in Section 65(3) which provides that:
"Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a
qualified indorsement, warrants that all prior parties had ca-
pacity to contract."
Illegality
Does a transferor by delivery or a qualified indorser warrant
against the defense of illegality when such illegality is of the
kind which constitutes a real defense? The following cases, it
is believed, answer this question in the affirmative. But along
with this result it is perhaps of more importance to consider the
reasons for it. The illegality cases, together with those on inca-
pacity, present a problem more realistically than do the forgery
and material alteration cases. It is sometimes said that there
is no warranty of the "quality" of the instrument; that there is
no warranty against "latent defects." And then it is said that
there is a warranty that the instrument sold shall correspond
to the description of the thing as it was referred to in the ne-
gotiations between buyer and seller. These general notions ap-
pear to have come from the law of sales of chattels, and, on the
whole, seem unwisely transplanted. In the forgery and material
alteration cases their use causes no harm because the sale of a
forged or altered bill can readily be said not to correspond to
the description of the subject matter discussed. There is little
danger that any court now would hold that the transferee of
a forged or altered bill got what he expected to get, or would
say that the defect was merely one of quality, though, as noted
above, Coke thought that the transferee assumed the risk of
coins received in payment being counterfeit. The problem
43 Lobdell v. Baker, 3 Metc. 469 (Blass. 1842) (incapacity lmown to
transferor but unknown to vendee); Brown v. Summers, 91 Ind. 151 (1883).
The express exception to this clause noted in § 65 (4) is discussed in the
next section.
-Erwin v. Downs, 15 N. Y. 575 (1857).
45 Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 202 (1847). The court said: "This rule [that]
there is an implied warranty in every sale that the thing sold is that for
which it was sold] .. . seems well applicable to the sale of the written
evidence of a liability, where the purchaser is understood to inquire for
himself into the ability of the parties to the paper, but usually takes it
for granted that the paper is genuine-that it is signed by persons capable
of binding themselves." 19 Vt. at 208. The court relied, in part, on Lob-
dell v. Baker, supro note 43.
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would likely have come up in cases of sales of instruments bear-
ing genuine signatures obtained under circumstances where
the signer did not know the character of the instrument which
he signed and was not negligent in not learning. And the ques-
tion would also have arisen on sales of paper not delivered by the
obligor. But no cases on the liability of the vendor of such
paper have been found. When we come to the cases of sales
of paper bearing genuine signatures of persons incapable of
contracting, or of persons capable of contracting but who en-
tered into illegal contracts, we have a different situation. In
both these cases, in one sense, we have contracts and the law,
for reasons of its own, destroys them. It is not like the forgery
and material alteration cases where there is absent the consen-
sual element. For this reason, then, enters the question as to
whether the "defect" is one of "quality" or of "lack of identity."
Conceivably, it may be regarded as either.
In the cases following, it will be noted that the courts have
made use of this language in marking out the fields of warranty
and no warranty, and the difficulty felt is, at times, apparent.
It will also be noted that the difficulty has caused, at times, a
virtual abandonment of this terminology as an instrument for
segregating the warranty states of fact from the no-warranty
states of fact. As an improvement thereon, appears the idea
that the vendor's warranties should be described with reference
to defenses of prior parties.
It is believed that the decisions justify this change in the ex-
pression of the rule. If this proves to be so it would make pos-
sible the use of a wide generalization, just in its results and
much clearer in meaning than that which was imported from
the law of chattels. It could then be phrased: a transferor by
delivery and an indorser without recourse warrant against all
real defenses of all prior parties. Or to go a step further, the
cases may justify the still wider generalization that these par-
ties warrant against all defenses of prior parties whether real
or personal, if available against the vendee. If this point is
reached, the warranties could then be defined in the affirmative,
form, -that the vendor warrants the existence of all facts neces-
sary to a recovery by the vendee against all prior parties. In
short, that the vendor warrants that the instrument is enforce-
able against all prior parties, or simply, that he can get a judg-
ment against all prior parties. Note that in this form the rule,
is not confined to warranties against equities of defense but
there is brought into the statement the warranty against out-
standing equities of ownership, or, as it is usually called, the.
warranty of title. If the rule were thus stated it would artic-
ulate perfectly with Professor Chafee's suggestion that the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law terms of "infirmity in the instrument"'
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and "defect in title" were poorly- chosen and that the ideas
might more clearly hays been described by the expressions,
"equities of defense" and "equities of ownership." It is be-
lieved the cases go this far.
There is still another possibility, involving an even wider gen-
eralization, but one concerning which there is more doubt, both
as to its existence in the casey and as to its wisdom. It could be
said that the vendor warrants not only that the instrument is
enforceable against all prior parties, but that he warrants that
no prior party has a defense, real or personal. Under this
form, the vendee, who was a holder in due course as against
all prior parties, and therefore so situated that he could get a
judgment against each of them, would be privileged to forego
this rLight and recover from his vendor. This question is dis-
cussed in a later section.
To take up the authorities: The leading English cases of
Young v. Cole," Lambert v. Heath,7 and, by implication, Gor-
pertz v. Bartlett," hold that there is a warranty, even though
the defendant had no knowledge of the illegality. In Goinpertz
v. Bartlett, the vendee of what purported to be a foreign bill,
invalid because being a domestic bill it was not stamped, was
allowed to recover from the vendor, indorser without recourse,
the consideration paid. Lord Campbell said:
"At the trial, I was impressed with the consideration that this
was a transaction of pure sale, and that the vendor really had
title to the bill which he sold, and was perfectly ignorant of
the latent defect ... and on the whole I was then inclined to
think that the defect was merely one in the quality, which the
vendor did not warrant. But now . . .I think that the action
is maintainable, on the ground that the article does not answer
the description of that which was sold, viz., a foreign bill....
I think, therefore, that the money paid for it may be recovered
as paid in mistake of facts. . . . If being what was sold, the
bill was valueless because of the insolvency of the parties the
vendor would not be answerable; but he is answerable if the
bill' be spurious."' -9
American cases are in accord.&O
In the subsequent case of Pooley v. Brounz,51 the difficulty in-
"c.3 Bing. N. C. 724 (1837). For discussion of this case see infra note 58.
47 15 Al. & W. 486 (1846). For discussion of this case see infra note 60.
- 2 E. & B. 849 (1853). •
49 Ibid 853. The court relied on Jones v. Ryde, supra note 7, and Young
v. Cole, supra note 46.
o See infra notes 54 to 76.
511 C. B. (N. s.) 565 (1862). In Hall v. Conder, 2 C. B. (N. s.) 20
(1857), the vendor of a patent was held not to warrant that it was in-
defeasible. The court thought that because each party had an equal means




volved in attempting to make the liability of the vendor turn
on the question whether the "defect" in the instrument made it
of a different description, or was merely one of quality-sug-
gested by Lord Campbell in Gompertz v. Bartlett---is again
illustrated. In this case a bill drawn in Belgium payable in
London was indorsed without recourse by the defendant to the
plaintiff. The law required the cancellation of the stamp thereon
under penalty of invalidity. Neither party did so and as a
result the acceptor was not liable. The court held that the
plaintiff could not recover from" his indorser without recourse.
Two judges based their decision on the ground that there was
no failure of consideration because the plaintiff got the specific
things which were the subject of the contract. This distinction
is here plausible because the invalidity did not arise until the
plaintiff got the bill. These judges also introduced the idea of
the defendant's change of position as a separate ground for
denial of the plaintiff's right to rescind. They thought that the
delay of one year in inaking presentment, the acceptor having
become bankrupt in the meantime, "prejudiced the vendor as
to his position in respect both of the drawer and acceptor" and
was therefore an added reason for denying the plaintiff's right
to sue. And one other member of the court considered the ele-
ment of delay to be the only ground on which plaintiff should
be defeated. Except for the delay this judge thought that the
case would be governed by Gompertz v. Bartlett.
Invalidity of Government and Private Securities
A type of case, somewhat allied both to the foregoing and to
the incapacity cases, raises the question as to when there should
be a warranty of the validity of government and private se-
curities, other than ordinary bills and notes. Under the doc-
trine of the cases just noted there would be such a warranty;
but new factors enter, i.e., the possibility of discovering that
the securities had not been issued in compliance with statutory
provisions, and perhaps certain considerations of public policy.
First, as regards the sale of public securities. Many authori-
ties hold that a vendor of public securities does not warrant
their validity, at least under all circumstances. One of the
leading cases is that of Otis v. Cullum, 3 wherein the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the vendor of municipal
bonds issued under an unconstitutional statute was not liable
to his vendee. The Court said:
52 Supra note 48. From the last sentence quoted from that case Lord
Campbell would seem to have abandoned the classification as a test of
liability.
53 92 U. S. 447 (1875).
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"...the plaintiffs [purchasers] got exactly what they intended
to buy... Such securities throng the channels of commerce,
which they are made to seek, and where they find their market.
They pass from hand to hand like bank notes. The seller is
liable ex delicto for bad faith; and ex cont'act. there is an im-
plied warranty on his part that they belong to him and that
they are not forgeries. Where there is no express stipulation
there is no liability beyond this .... It would be unreasonably
harsh to hold all those through whose hands such instruments
may have passed liable." 5
As indicated in the note,55 Otis v. Czdlum has been often relied
upon to defeat liability of vendors of public securities which
for one reason or another were deemed "invalid." Usually the
facts which constitute the "invalidity" are set forth but vaguely
in the cases. Just what is actually decided, therefore, is a
matter of some doubt. And particularly in view of the subse-
quent case of Meyer v. Ricluwrds 3 are the limits of the rule in
54Ibid. Compare the case of First National Bank v. Drew, supra note 3,
where the assignee of claims of a contractor for public work against the
taxing district, not paid by the district because the assessment did not
produce sufficient funds, could not recover from his assignor. The court
relied on Otis v. Cullum and Littauer v. Goldman, 72 N. Y. 506 (1878).
-5 White v. Robinson, 50 Mich. 73, 14 N. W. 704 (1883), holding that
the transferor of school orders was not liable to his transferee, it appear-
ing that "the school officers exceeded their authority." The court Laid:
"A sale of genuine documents may involve a warranty of title but we do
not think it involves any warranty that the officers had lawful authority
to act in the given case." The court relied on Otis v. Cullum. Note also
Ruohs v. Bank, 94 Tenn. 57, 28 S. W. 303 (1894), where the transferor
of municipal bonds, unenforceable because issued under an unconstitutional
statute, was held not liable to his purchaser. The court relied on Lambert
v. Heath, 15 M. & W. 486, infra note 60, and Otis v. Cullum. Accord:
First National Bank v. Oldham, 74 Tenn. 718 (1881); Richardson v. Mar-
shall County, 100 Tenn. 346, 45 S. W. 440 (1898); Union Bank v. Oxford
& C. L. R. R., 143 Fed. 193 (C. C. A. 4th, 1906) (relying on Otis v. Cul-
lum); Sutro v. Rhodes, 92 Cal. 117, 28 Pac. 98 (1891) (county bonds in-
valid "because issued without authority;" also relied on Otis v. Cullum).
56 163 U. S. 385, 16 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1896). In this case certain numbered
state bonds of an issue which consolidated all state bonds were held by the
state treasurer for educational purposes. Subsequently, the sum so rep-
resented was declared a perpetual loan to the state and these bonds or-
dered destroyed. Thereupon the state treasurer, instead of destroying the
bonds, sold them. The defendant bought some of them on the market and
sold them to the plaintiff, who sued to recover the amount paid. Held:
judgment for the plaintiff.
The main question discussed was whether the implied warranty included
any obligation other than that the instrument was not forged. The Court
said: "the undoubted rule is that, in such a sale, the obligation of the
vendor is not restricted to the mere question of forgery vel non, but de-
pends upon whether he has delivered that which he contracted to sell, this
rule being designated, in England, as a condition of the principal contract,
as to the essence and substance of the thing agreed to be sold, and in this
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Otis v. Cullum not clear. With reference to the passage from
Otis v. Cullum, quoted above, the court said that this remark
had been interpreted too narrowly. In making it, "the mind
was directed to that form of non-existence which more com-
monly obtains and the expression is a mere illustration of the
rule de eo quod plerumque'fit." While the Court, in Meyer v.
Richard.s, is thus perfectly clear that a vendor warrants against
forms of invalidity other than that of forgery, the question as
to where the line between various defenses is to be drawn is
indefinite. That a vendor of public securities does not warrant
against all defenses which the obligor may successfully assert
appears from the statement of Mr. Justice White:
"If this were a case where a vendee claimed to recover back
the price paid by him on a purchase of negotiable securities,
which pass by delivery from hand, on the averment that after
the sale it had developed that they were not valid . . . because
the law under which they had been issued was constitutionally
void or ultra vires, the claim of implied warranty of existence
would be without merit. . . . [Both parties would be] neces-
sarily equally chargeable with notice of want of power, and
therefore would be presumed to have acted with reference to
such knowledge. This is Otis v. Cullum. But it is not the
case at bar, since it is here admitted that both parties, in enter-
ing into the contract of sale, contemplated valid securities, of
which there were many outstanding, and those delivered were
void, not because of want of power to enact the law under which
they were issued, or because they were ultra vires for some
other legal cause, but because they were stricken with nullity
by a constitutional provision adopted after the act authorizing
the issue of the securities and where nothing on the face of
the bonds indicated that they were illegal. The distinction
pointed out by the foregoing statement not only illustrates the
correctness of the decision in Otis v. Cullum, but also demon-
strates the error of attempting to extend it to the state of facts
presented in the case under consideration."
Meyer v. Richards is similar in its facts and holding to Young
v. Cole, a case often relied upon. In this case a vendor of
Guatemala bonds, invalid because not stamped within a desig-
nated time by a government agent, a fact unknown to both
parties, was held liable by his vendee in an action for money
had and received for the consideration paid therefor.'s There
country being generally termed an implied warranty of identity of the
thing sold." 163 U. S. at 405, 16 Sup. Ct. at 1155.
57 163 U. S. at 414, 16 Sup. Ct. at 1158.
58 Tindal, J., said: "the consideration ... failed as completely as if the De-
fendant had contracted to sell foreign gold coin and had handed over
counters instead. It is not a question of warranty; but whether the De-
fendant has not delivered something which, though resembling the article
contracted to be sold, is of no value." 3 Bing. N. C. at 730. Bosanquet, J.,
spoke of it as "worthless paper" and Coltman, J., said they "were not
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are a number of authorities which either adopt the distinction
drawn in Meyer v. Richwords or are possibly contra to Otis v.
Cullum.5 9
It appears, therefore, that a vendor of public securities, at
Guatemala bonds." The two lines of reasoning in this type of case are
here illustrated.
59Keller v. Hicks. 22 Cal. 457 (1863), transferor of illegally issued
county warrants liable to his vendee. But in Sutro v. Rhodes, supro. note
55, the vendors of county bonds, invalid because in excess of statutory
authority, were held not liable, the court relying on Otis v. Cullum. Rogers
v. Walsh, 12 Neb. 28, 10 N. W. 467 (1881), holding a vendor of "warrants
issued by the commissioners of York county without authority of law,"
there being at the time "valid county warrants in the markct," liable to
his vendee. The court held that this case was not similar to Lambert v.
Heath, supra note 55, or Otis v. Cullum, but was governed by Young v.
Cole. Same holding after trial, 15 Neb. 309, 18 N. W. 135 (1884). McCay
v. Barber & Son, 37 Ga. 423 (1867); Tompdns v. Little Rock, 15 Fed. 6
(C. C. E. D. Ark. 1882), holding a railroad company liable to its vendees for
the sale of state bonds unconstitutionally issued and delivered as gifts by
the state to the railroad. The court relied on Young v. Cole and Jones v.
Ryde, and distinguished Lambert v. Heath. Puch v. Moore, Hyams & Co.,
44 La. Ann. 209, 10 So. 710 (1892); Herwig v. Richardson & May, 44 La.
Ann. 703, 11 So. 135 (1892), Louisiana cases dealing with the same bond
issue as that involved in Meyer v. Richards. Furgerson v. Staples, 82
Me. 159, 19 AtI. 158 (1889), sale of void town orders; the vendee recovered.
In Bank of Commerce v. Ruffin, 190 Mo. App. 124, 175 S. W. 303 (1915),
an instrument, purporting to evidence a Hen for taxes but void because the
construction work, a sidewalk, was not located according to the city ordi-
nance, was assigned by the contractor. Held: that the assignor, although
he had no kmowledge of the invalidity, was liable to his assignee. The
court disapproved Littauer v. Goldman, supra note 54, and approved the
criticism of this case in Meyer v. Richards. The court distinguished Otis
v. Cullum, on the ground that "there is no implied warranty in cases of
sales of government securities," because in such case "the defect render-
ing the bonds void is not latent but patent, because it appears on the rec-
ords of the governmental body." Accord: Miners' Bank v. Burress, 164
Mo. App. 690, 147 S. W. 1110 (1912) (invalid tax bills).
Hart v. Wyndmere, 21 N. D. 383, 131 N. W. 271 (1911) (vendor of
invalid village warrants liable); Giblin v. North Wisconsin Lbr. Co., 131
Wis. 261, 111 N. W. 499 (1907) (vendor of illegally issued county -war-
rants liable). In Wood v. Sheldon, 42 N. J. L. 421 (1880), a vendor of a
non-negotiable stock certificate, referred to as a "scrip dividend," was held
liable by his vendee to refund the consideration paid. In another case this
issue had been decreed to be "illegal and fraudulent." Both parties were
ignorant of the invalidity at the time of sale. The court said: "The
plaintiff did not bargain for the certificate, but for the money of which
the certificate purported to be evidence of title. . . If a person sells a
bond . . . the legal incidents of the transaction are thq same as if the
article sold had been a horse . . . The defendants, by the mere act of
selling impliedly held out that the title to this money was in them...
The ill-founded belief of the defendants, that they were possessed of a
good title, is an ingredient of the case of no value for the ground of
recovery is not deceit, but warranty." 42 N. J. L. at 423. The court relied
on Young v. Cole and Gompertz v. Bartlett.
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least under the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States,
will be liable if the facts fall within the limits of the rule in
Meyer v. Richards and will not be liable if they fall within the
decision of Otis v. Cullum. But where are these limits? No
case has been found, since Meyer v. Richards, where both have
been referred to. And the cases mentioned in the notes, some
holding the vendor liable and others holding him not liable, do
not shed much light on the question. If Otis v. Cullum covers
no case other than that of a bond issue put out under unconsti-
tutional legislation, this test would be fairly definite, but not
entirely so. How far back would this narrow interpretation be
carried? If the statute under which the bonds are issued is a
general statute and constitutional but the statute under which
the government body' was organized is unconstitutional, or the
statute under which the officers, who put out the bonds, were
elected is unconstitutional, does Otis v. Cullum apply? When
is a statute unconstitutional within the meaning of Otis v. Cul-
lur? But this is not the only uncertainty in the rule in Otis V.
Cullum. It is not even to be limited to cases involving uncon-
stitutional legislation, for Mr. Justice White in the passage
above quoted from Meyer v. Richards said that Otis v. Cullum
applied also when the bond issue was "ultra vires for some other
legal cause." If this statement represents law and not dictum,
Otis v. Cullum is by far the wider rule and Meyer v,. Richards
may be confined to cases where bonds in circulation were once
enforceable and became unenforceable by subsequently enacted
constitutional legislation. It is extremely unlikely, however,
that the Meyer v. Richards rule would be so narrowly construed
as to be held not to apply to sets of facts other than those where
invalidity arises from subsequently enacted legislation.
It may be that the distinction lies along another line. In
Otis v. Cullum all the facts which produced unenforceability
were a matter of public record and therefore within the possi-
ble possession of every one; but not so in Meyer v. Rihcrds.
If a buyer looked them up he would know that the issue was
invalid, assuming of course the requisite capacity for prophesy-
ing that the courts would hold the statute unconstitutional. This
risk is heavy. It is also practically impossible for a buyer to
gather together all the facts necessary for a judgment as to
the validity of a particular bond issue. To deprive the vendee
of a right against the vendor because the vendee is supposed
to know of the defense is a pure fiction. The fiction, however,
may conceal real reasons. Public officers who put out the issue,
in many cases-perhaps most-would not be liable to purchasers.
It can be argued that sellers of the bonds should be in the same
position. It could be urged also that a rule which put liability
on sellers of government and municipal bonds would hamper
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distribution. Discount rates, on account of the risk, might be
higher. On the whole it may reasonably be felt that the pub-
lic, in whose interests the money is thus obtained, will be better
off if the risk of invalidity is borne by the purchasers. The
rule of the two cases would then be that, where all the facts
necessary to determine validity or invalidity of the particular
instrument offered for sale are of public record, a seller will
not warrant enforceability; but where they are not all avail-
able, as in leyer v. Richords, a seller will be liable. The rule
in Otis v. Cullm , and the cases which follow it, is not neces-
sarily out of harmony with the idea that a vendor of commercial
paper warrants against all real defenses, for in such cases it may
be considered that the buyer could have learned of the defense.
Knowledge by the vendee, of any defense, can be treated as a de-
struction of the implied warranty with respect thereto.
The above cases deal with bonds issued by some governmental
authority. To what extent does the rule apply to the sale of
private securities? In Lanbert v. Heath,r there was a sale of
"scrip certificates of shares in the Kentish Coast Railway Com-
pany." There was evidence that the scrip had been "issued
without authority." In an action by the vendee against the
vendor, the court left it to the jury "to say whether the scrip
bought by the defendant for the plaintiff was genuine scrip
of the Kentish Coast Railway Company or not." The jury
found that it was not and returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
A new trial was ordered. The entire opinion of Alderson, B.,
was as follows:
"The question is simply this-was what the palties bought
in the market 'Kentish Coast Railway Scrip'? It appears that
it was signed by the secretary of the compatly; and if this was
the only Kentish Coast Railway scrip in the market, as appears
to have been the case, and one person chooses to sell and an-
other to buy that, then the latter has got all that he contracted
to buy. That was the question for the jury, but it was not left
to them: the rule must therefore be absolute for a new trial."
The inference is that the defendant was not liable because "he
got all that he contracted to buy"--whatever this may mean-
just as in Young v. Cole the vendor of unstamped. Guatemala
bonds was held liable because the buyer did not get all that he
contracted to buy. This reminds one of Lord Abinger's dis-
covery of the difference between beans and peas." Doubtless
there is a difference, but it is of no more importance, in this
connection, than is the difference between green beans and wax
beans, or beans of the same specie that will germinate and those
that will not, or between musty beans and fresh beans. And
rOSupra note 55.
G1 Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Al. & W. 399 (1838).
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the same with bonds. If the parties think about it at all they
think of the purchase and sale of legal obligations. The buyer
takes the risk of insolvency of the obligor-probably consciously
so. And certain risks, theoretically ascertainable by inspection
of public records, as well as the risk of ignorance of a good
deal of the law of the land, may also be put upon him-but
hardly for the reason stated in Lambert v. Heath. In fact the
English court itself, in Hall v. Conder,2 shifts to the much
more reasonable basis of classification by holding that the ven-
dor of a patent did not warrant that it was indefeasible be-
cause each party had an equal means of ascertaining the facts,
and that for this reason the case did not fall within Young V.
Cole and Gompertz v. Bartlett. There is nothing in the English
cases of Young v. Cole or Lambert v. Heath, or the American
cases of Otis v. Cullum and Meyer v. Richards, confining the
rule, whatever it is, which in certain cases puts the risk
of invalidity on the buyer, to transactions involving govern-
ment securities. The same is true of the cases cited in the
notes,63 with the exception of the Missouri case,64 in which it
was said that "there is no such implied warranty in cases of
sales of government securities." 65
Accordingly there are cases, involving the sale of private se-
curities, where the risk of invalidity is put on the buyer, al-
though the reasons therefor are not as strong, perhaps, as in
the sale of public securities. But few cases on the point have
been found. In a California case 06 concerning the sale of bonds
of a water company where the vendee claimed that the bonds
were invalid because the provisions of the statute were not com-
plied with, the court refused to go into this question on the
authority of Sutro I. Rhodes,67 a case involving the sale of in-
valid county bonds which, in turn, relied on Otis v. Cullum.
The court, upon the principle of that case, said: "we must
hold that the defendant [buyer] herein cannot resist the pay-
ment of the note [given in payment] sued on. He got from the
plaintiff exactly what he intended to buy and did buy, viz., one
of the bonds of the corporation." The court then shifted to
the preferable line of argument by adding: "He had the same
opportunity as the plaintiff to ascertain the steps that had been
taken by the corporation in the issuance of the bonds, and
whether he made such examination or not he bought subject to
622 C. B. (N. s.) 22, 53 (1862).
63Supra notes 55 and 59.
84 Bank of Commerce v. Ruffin, supra note 59.
6. 190 Mo. App. at 136, 175 S. W. at 307.
66 Harvey v. Dale, 96 Cal. 160, 31 Pac. 14 (1892). See also Coast Realty
Co. v. St. Co., 118 Miss. 690, 79 So. 848 (1918).
6 Supra notes 55 and 59.
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the rule of caveat emptor and assumed all the risk of its invalid-
ity." 63 Other cases are to the same effectD
With respect to the sale of government and private securities
Section 65(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law imposes the
warranty "that all prior parties had capacity to contract." The
last paragraph of Section 65(4) then prescribes an exception
by adding: "The provisions of subdivision three of this sec-
tion do not apply'to persons negotiating public or corporation
securities, other than bills and notes." In all cases, therefore,
which fall within this language, there is no implied warranty of
capacity. Such cases will then be controlled by Section 65(1),
(2) and (4) ; (1) dealing with genuineness, (2) with title and
(4) with the warranty against invalidity when the transferor
has knowledge thereof. Subsection (4) is discussed in the next
section. It becomes important therefore to know just what
cases are withdrawn from Section 65 (3). It is believed that
this Section, worded as broadly as it is, rules out all such cases
as were discussed in the last section. The result is that a court
can no longer hold, as was done in Meyer v. Richards, that under
the facts of that case there was a warranty of validity although
the transferor had no knowledge thereof, because, after the
Act, knowledge of invalidity is by Section 65 (4) essential to
the vendor's liability.
The term "securities" might well have been defined in the
Act. Moreover, there is no very strong reason why the excep-
tion should apply only to the securities of corporations as dis-
tinguished from other forms of business organization.
Knowledge of Invalidity
In none of the long line of cases noted in the last section was
it held that the right of a vendee to rescind or sue for breach
of warranty was conditioned upon proof that the defendant
knew of the defense of the prior party which constituted the
breach. Yet in Littaver v. Goldmavn 7 the New York court held
Gs 96 Cal. at 161, 31 Pac. at 15.
69BIarshall v. Keach, 227 Il. 35, 81 N. E. 29 (1907), holding that in the
sale of certificates of stock in a private corporation there is no implied
warranty that the stock was issued by a de jure corporation. Accord:
Harter v. Eltzroth, 111 Ind. 159, 12 N. E. 129 (187). Both courts relied
on Otis v. Cullum.
If the seller is guilty of fraud, there could then, of course, be rezcission
for this reason independent of the above rule. Currier v. Poor, 155 N. Y.
344, 49 N. E. 937 (1898).
70 Supra note 54. In many of the earlier cases in New York and else-
where, where usury was the defense, the defendant did have kmowledge
of the defense. Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y. 226 (1859); Ross v.
Terry, 63 N. Y. 613 (1875); cf. Smith v. Corege, 53 Ark. 295, 14 S. W.
93 (1890); Drennan v. Bunn, 124 111. 175, 16 N. E. 100 (1888); Challis
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that knowledge was necessary, at least where the maker's de-
fense was usury. In addition to the cases to the contrary noted
in the preceding sections, the cases collected in the note hold
that knowledge is not necessary.71 Likewise in Wood v. Shel-
don,72 the New Jersey court said that Littauer v. Goldman was
"admittedly supported by no precedent," and held that a vendor
of illegally issued scrip was liable although he had no knowl-
edge of the invalidity. The Supreme Court of the United
States also held otherwise in Meyer v. Richards,73 referring to
Littauer v. Goldman as "an exceptional case," and concurring
in the criticism of it by the New Jersey court. A Missouri
appellate court also approved these criticisms. 4 And New York
itself has discredited the doctrine, for in McClure v. Central
Trust Co.,7 5 the court said:
"In view of the latest case in this court upon the subject of
implied warranty, Littauer v. Goldman may properly be limited
to commercial paper, as it is the policy of the law to throw
special safeguards around the transfer of such property. Al-
though cited in the cage of Flandrow v. Hammond,"0 it was not
allowed to control the decision."77
Warranty of Liability of Prior Parties
It appears then that at common law a transferor by delivery
and an indorser without recourse warranted against all real
v. McCrum, 22 Kan. 121 (1379); Hannum v. Richardson, 48 Vt. 508 (1875).
Littauer v. Goldman misinterpreted these cases by assuming that such
knowledge was a requisite of liability.
7. Ellis v. Grooms, 1 Stew. 47 (Ala. 1827) ; .McCay v. Barber & Son, 37
Ga. 423 (1867); Frazier v. D'Invilliers, 2 Pa. 200 (1845) (indorser without
recourse held liable on note where marks of payment erased); Mays v. Col-
lison, 6 Leigh 230 (Va. 1835) (accord); Boyd v. Anderson, 1 Overt. 438
(Tenn. 1809) (assignor of invalid land warrants liable to assignee); Law-
ton v. Howe, 114 Wis. 241 (1861). (same). Payments in money of the
Confederacy were usually held to discharge the debt. Rogers v. Bass, 46
Tex. 505 (1877); Mercer v. Wiggins, 74 N. C. 48 (1876); Rockhold v.
Blevins, 6 Baxt. 115 (Tenn. 1873); Howard College v. Turner, 71 Ala. 429
(1882). But cf. Cooksey v. McCrery, 27 Ark. 303 (1871). But where pay-
ment was made within the federal lines the transfer was held no payment.
Ewing v. Litsey, 70 Ky. 496 (1870). Transfers after the war were not
payments, Cundiff v. Herron, 33 Tex. 622 (1870), the question being whether
the instrument was regarded as legal at the time and place of transfer.
72Supra note 59.
73 Supra note 56.
- Bank of Commerce v. Ruffin, supra note 59.
75165 N. Y. 108, 58 N. E. 777 (1900).
6148 N. Y. 129, 42 N. E. 511 (1895).
7 165 N. Y. at 126, 58 N. E. at 782. An express warrantor against
usury is held liable although he does not know of the usury. Buehler v.
Pierce, 175 N. Y. 264, 67 N. E. 573 (1903).
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defenses of all prior parties. Littaiter v. Goldmcan alone was
to the contrary in requiring knowledge of the defense when
the defense was that of illegality. But these warranties, here
treated as separate, were really but manifestations of a single
warranty, the warranty that all prior parties were liable, or,
as put in many cases, the transferor warrants that the instru-
ment is valid and subsisting.
As expressed by the Indiana court:
"There is a vast difference between the liability of an indorser
and that of a mere assignor. The former warrants the liability
and the ability of the payor to pay, while the latter simply war-
rants the genuineness of the obligation, and that it is unpaid." 13
Or, as put by the Kentucky court:
"The appellant [assignor] when he assigned the note under-
took and agreed with the assignee that the latter could enforce
it against the parties whose names were signed to it, or at least
that a legal obligation existed upon the part of the obligors to
pay it." 79
There are other authorities which fuse the specific warranties
into the single idea of enforceability.'; Accordingly, if there are
no defenses of prior parties as against the holder, that is, if
the transferee may or has obtained a judgment against them,
there is no breach of warranty by the transferor.8' Similarly,
the indorser without recourse warrants the existence of all facts
necessary to a recovery by his vendee against all prior parties.c
7s Earnest v. Barrett, 6 Ind. App. 371, 373, 33 N. E. 635, 63G (1892).
79 Hurst v. Chambers, 75 Ky. 155, 158 (1876).
80 Ellis v. Grooms, supra note 71; Michel v. Valentine, 10 Rob. 404 (La.
1845); Eaton v. Mellus, 7 Gray 566 (Blass. 1856); Carroll v. Nodine, 41
Ore. 412, 69 Pac. 51 (1902).
"I do not entertain any doubt that the defendant [transferor by delivery]
impliedly warranted against any legal defense to an action to be brought
on the note." Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, supra note 70, at 231. ".
the assignor impliedly warrants that [the note] is valid, and that the
maker is liable upon it." Daskam v. Ullman, 74 Wis. 474, 470, 43 N. W.
321 (1889). The vendor warrants against the maker's right of set-off.
Jones v. Yeargin, 12 N. C. 420 (1828) (transferor by delivery); Ticonic
Bank v. Smiley, 27 Ale. 225 (1847) (qualified indorser).
8- Clark v. Sallaska, 70 Okla. 293, 174 Pac. 505 (1918) (transferee by
delivery who had obtained judgment against maker of note held not en-
titled to judgment against transferor).
82The indorser without recourse warrants the instrument "valid against
all signers," Hankerson v. Emery, 37 Ale. 16 (1853); "that it is not dis-
charged," Mays v. Collison, 6 Leigh 230 (Va. 1835) ; that a mortgage which
secures the note so indorsed, is a valid lien on the whole of the land
described, Templeman v. Hamilton & Co., 37 La. Ann. 754 (1885); Wait
v. Williams, 107 S. C. 32, 91 S. E. 969 (1916); Palmer v. Courtney, 32
Neb. 773, 49 N. W. 754 (1891); Freeman v. Guyer, 13 Ill. 652 (1852).
"By selling the note indorsed 'without recourse' to the plaintiff the de-
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Are specific warranties generalized into a single one under
the Negotiable Instruments Law? The framers thereof would
have done well to have dealt more specifically with the entire
field of real defenses. What we have is a scattered and partial
treatment. They did not deal with illegality as a real defense.
No section touches on the fraud, in inception cases, nor those
involving negligent execution. Incapacity is omitted, except by
the barest reference in Section 22. This being the situation one
would hardly expect the framers of the Act to think in terms
of the entire field of real defenses in defining the warranties
of the vendor. Yet they did approach it in the clause which
imposes a warranty that "the instrument is in all respects what
it purports to be." If the specific warranty of genuineness in
Section 65(1) and of capacity in Section 65(3), be regarded as
illustrations of this wider warranty, then it is believed the war-
ranty that the instrument "is in all respects what it purports
to be" should include all other real defenses, except as the first
part of, Section 65(4) operates as a limitation thereon. This
latter provision, in making the warranty of validity depend on
knowledge of the vendor, changed the law. It is unfortunate
that the exceptional doctrine of Littauer v. Goldman should
have thus found lodgment in the Statute. It is out of harmony
with the general ideas as to the nature of warranty in sales of
chattels and with the present tendencies in this field of the law.
Warranty Against Personal Defenses
Is there also a warranty against personal defenses? The cases
noted, in holding and asserting that there is a warranty "that
the instrument is not paid," that "prior parties have no legal
defense thereto," that "prior parties are liable," that the maker
"has no right of set-off," and that the instrument as against
prior parties "is valid and subsisting," all tend to show that
there is such a warranty. At least, they tend to show that there
is such warranty when the personal defense would be available
as against the vendee.
This inference is further borne out by the cases involving im-
plied warranties in the assignment of non-negotiable choses in
action. That such cases may properly be considered pertinent
to questions arising from the sale of negotiable paper appears
fendant represented that the same was a valid subsisting obligation. The
proof established that it had been satisfied . . . it seems clear that plain-
tiff is entitled to recover the amount so paid." Roley v. Walker, 161 Ill.
App. 646 (1911). Accord: Frazer v. D'Invilliers, supra note 71. "In
purchasing the notes [indorsed without recourse] plaintiffs took their
chances on the financial responsibility of the makers and indorsers but had
a right to rely upon the representation that they were legally bound."
Hoover v. Pursel, 67 Pa. Sup. Ct. 130 (1917).
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in many decisions, and in fact the cases are often used inter-
changeably. Indeed questions as to implied warranties in the
sale of chattels, non-negotiable choses in action and negotiable
instruments, are but different aspects of the same fundamental
legal policy. On this unity of purpose and of means of accom-
plishment, the New York Court of Appeals once declared:
"The principle which governs sales of tangible chattels ap-
plies with equal force to sales of incorporeal chattels, such as
a promissory note without indorsement, or a share of stock,
where the thing actually sold is the right evidenced by a piece
of paper with a particular name, though the form of the sale
is of the paper itself." 11
From the cases collected in the note,84 it appears that an as-
signor of a non-negotiable chose in action warrants that he has
83 McClure v. Central Trust Co., supra note 75, at 123, 58 N. E. at 781.
Cf. WLISTON, op. cit. supra note 33, at § 445: "Indeed there seems no
reason to distinguish the warranties to be implied on the assignment of a
non-negotiable chose in action from those implied when negotiable instru-
ments are sold without indorsement or with only a qualified indorsement."
84 The assignee of a bond has "an indefeasible right to demand what the
bond calls for." Emmerson v. Claywell, 53 Ky. 15 (1853). The assignee
of a claim not due to the assignor because of the non-fulfillment of a con-
dition precedent-the birth of a colt-may recover from the assignor. Gil-
christ v. Hilliard, 53 Vt. 592 (1880). The assignor without recourse of a
bond for $1300, on -which was due only $666.10, is liable to the assignee.
Trustees of Broaddus Institute v. Siers, 68 W. Va. 125, 09 S. E. 468
(1910).
"Every holder of an obligation, who assigns it to another... impliedly
at least, thereby engages that it is genuine and binding upon the obligor."
Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. 482, 485 (1868) (plaintiff failed to recover on bond
issued by school district to defendant who had not rendered the service for
-which bond was given in advance).
The assignor of a judgment warrants that the amount called for thereby
is due and unpaid. Furniss v. Ferguson, 15 N. Y. 437 (1857); Findley
v. Smith, 42 W. Va. 299, 26 S. E. 370 (1896); Thompson v. First State
Bank, 102 Ga. 696, 29 S. E. 610 (1897) (assignor warrants that the judg-
ment assigned "is unpaid and a valid subsisting debt"). And see WILTisTo,
op. cit. supra note 33, at § 445. The assignor without recourse of a judg-
ment -which -was reversed subsequent to the assignment is liable to the
assignee because such an assignor "warrants that it is what it purports
to be, that it is unpaid and constitutes a legal obligation against the de-
fendant therein." Emerson v. Knapp, 75 Mo. App. 92 (1898). Accord:
Cooper v. Sagert, 111 Ore. 27, 223 Pac. 943 (1924). But an assignor of
a judgment entered by confession does not impliedly warrant that the
judgment cannot be vacated. Hinkley v. Champaign National Bank, 210 11.
559, 564, 75 N. E. 210, 212 (1905): "The implied warranty is that it is a
genuine judgment, that in due form of law a judgment was entered, that
the court had jurisdiction to enter it and that it has not been paid, released
or otherwise nullified."
The assignor of a bond for title does not warrant that the obligor will
perform. Hazer v. Yost, 54 Ark. 485, 16 S. W. 372 (1891) (assignor held
not liable to assignee for expenses incurred in obtaining conveyance).
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performed all conditions precedent to his right to demand per-
formance by the obligor, that the claim is owing and unpaid, and
that it is a valid subsisting debt, the legal obligation of the ob-
ligor. While all defenses to an action on a simple contract are
not here illustrated, there is a sufficient number and variety to
support the wider statement, also appearing in the cases, that
the assignor warrants against the existence of all equities of
defenses and of ownership which the obligor or a third party
may have against the assignor. Thus the assignee, in taking
subject to equities and defenses, obtains his reimbursement from
his assignor.
In this connection a digression may be made to note that
an assignment of a non-negotiable instrument is sometimes made
"without recourse." This qualification has an obvious general
purpose when used in connection with the transfer of negotiable
paper. What effect should be given to it when used on non-
negotiable paper? It has been held that such an assignment
has the same effect as is given to the indorsement without re-
course of negotiable paper, and that, apparently, this meaning
is not subject to variation by agreement of the parties.' Ac-
cording to Williston, "the more reasonable construction of these
words is that the assignor is only seeking to make certain what
the law would indeed, in any event, imply from a mere assign-
ment, that he is not responsible for the solvency of the debtor." 11
In some cases the assignment without recourse of non-negotiable
choses in action means the same as does the indorsement with-
out recourse of negotiable paper, but presumptively only. The
meaning may be controlled by the parties.87 In other states,
there is no presumption as to the meaning of the words, but
parol evidence is admissible to show in what sense the parties
used them and this meaning when found will control8 At the
85 Houston v. McNeer, 40 W. Va. 365, 22 S. E. 80 (1895); Trustees of
Broaddus Institute v. Siers, supra note 84; Crawford v. M'Donald, 2 I.
& M. 189 (Va. 1803) (assignment of vendee's interest in a contract to sell
land without recourse shows that the assignee "was to run all hazards as
to the title to the lands").
80 WLLISToN, op. cit. supra note 33, at § "445.
87 "Those words ['without recourse'] have no precise legal signification
outside the law of commercial paper, and unless it is manifest that they
were intended to express a different meaning they must be given their
ordinary effect." Kail v. Bell, 88 Kan. 666, 668, 129 Pac. 1135, 1136 (1913).
88 Binswanger v. Hewitt, 79 Misc. 425, 140 N. Y. Supp. 143 (1913), an
action by an assignee against the assignor of a judgment for breach of
the warranty that the judgment was owing and unpaid. It was argued
on the one hand, that inasmuch as the chose assigned was not negotiable,
the words "without recourse" were a mere nullity, and on the other that
they had the effect of destroying the implied warranty that the judgment
was still owing. The court replied: "We cannot adopt either view. ...
[We] hold that this phrase used in an assignment of a chose in action,
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other extreme, it has been held that such an assignment
destroys, at least presumptively, the implied warranties which
otherwise would have accompanied it.2
Returning to the main point, it would seem, therefore, that
at common law there was a warranty against personal defenses,
at least as against a holder who took subject to such personal
defense. If the payee acquires the note from the maker by
fraud or under other circumstances which give the maker a
defense against the payee, and the payee transfers by delivery
or indorses without recourse to A, after maturity, is there any
reason to doubt the liability of the payee to A? Of course, if A
is not a holder in due course because he kmows of the defense,
or is a donee, these facts would destroy the warranty by impli-
cation.
If the vendor warrants against personal defenses which hap-
pen to be available against the vendee, does the vendor warrant
against them if his vendee is a holder in due comse? Does the
vendor warrant against personal defenses irrespective of their
availability against the vendee, or does he merely warrant the
existence of such facts as will enable his vendee to get a judg-
ment against all prior parties?
There is but little authority here. It has been held in a Michi-
gan case that the mere fact that the vendee was a holder in due
course, and could, therefore, hold the maker liable free from
his personal defense of illegality, did not prevent him from
having no defined legal meaning, must be given such meaning as the par-
ties themselves intended to give it which must be determined as a ques-
tion of fact taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances,
giving due weight to the parol evidence that may be adduced having refer-
ence thereto!' 79 Misc. at 430, 140 N. Y. Supp. at 145. Because neither
party adopted this theory at the trial, the judgment for the plaintiff was
reversed. Accord: Charnley v. Dulles, 64 Pa. 353 (1845), holding that the
liability of an indorser "without recourse" of a non-negotiable certificate
of deposit, on which the payee's indorsement was forged, was not neces-
sarily that of the liability of an indorser without recourse of negotiable
paper.
9' "The words sans recours (without recourse), so far as we can ascer-
tain, have no exact legal significance, except when they are employed by
an indorser to limit his liability upon a negotiable instrument" After
stating that an assignment of a judgment carried certain warranties and
also the beneficial interests of the judgment creditor, the court concluded:
"the only legal effect produced by the use of [the words 'without recourse']
is to relieve the assignor from liability to the assignee on account of the
breach of either of the several implied warranties." Thompson v. First
State Bank, supra note 84, at 698, 29 S. E. at 610. The case is referred
to in Camp Mfg. Co. v. Durham Fertilizer Co., 150 N. C. 417, 64 S. E.
188 (1909). This rule, apparently, was applied in Scofield v. Moore, 31
Iowa 241 (1871), where the assignor without recourse of a judgment was
held relieved from his Warranty that it had not been paid.
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recovering from his vendor.90 The vendor, in this case, however,
knew of the defense, and it is possible that he expressly war-
ranted the enforceability of the note to his vendee, the plaintiff.
The possible existence of the express warranty here would seem
to be of slight importance, however, because there was as much
-doubt as to its content as there is with respect to the content
of the corresponding implied warranty. The element of knowl-
edge of the defense by the vendor was treated by the court as
the main reason for his liability to the vendee. This would
seem to be. a just result. It puts the loss on the party at fault
with the minimum of time and expense. Otherwise, the vendee
would recover from the maker, who in turn would sue the fraud-
ulent payee.
A California case, however, is contra, for here the vendee
was not allowed to recover from the vendor, payee, who had
received payments before maturity from the maker, because
the vendee was a holder in due course. The court said:
"... being.., a bona fide holder.., for value -and without
notice of the payments made.., he cannot suffer loss by reason
,of such payments. In order to support a recovery... there must
not only have been a breach of the agreement on his part but
some loss or damage resulting to the promisee." "I
'This result is open to the objection pointed out by the Michigan
-court.
In each of the above cases the vendor not only had knowledge
" Evans v. Stuhrberg, 78 Mich. 145, 149, 43 N. W. 1046, 1047 (1889).
'The court stated its reasons as follows: "If this note was made good in
the hands of the plaintiff because she was an innocent purchaser, she was
made such innocent purchaser by the fraud of the defendant, who con-
cealed from her not only the original consideration of the note, but war-
ranted it to be a good note when he knew it was not a valid one, except
as it might be made so by the success of his description and falsehood.
The law in such a case will not force the plaintiff to collect the note against
the maker, though she may be able to do so, nor allow the defendant to
reap a profit from his own fraud, as well as to galvanize by such fraud a
dead note into life. . . . The commercial law in favor of innocent pur-
chasers . . . was not intended as a shield to those fraudulently putting
in circulation illegal or void notes."
91Swall v. Clarke, 51 Cal. 227, 229 (1876). In this case the maker
paid the payee a part of the note before maturity. The payee transferred
without indorsement to A and covenanted that a specified sum was due
thereon. This was not true for it failed to take account of these payments,
A transferred to B and expressly assigned this covenant. B sued the
payee. Held: he could not recover. The express covenant here, it is bc-
lieved, would be no wider than the implied one. There having been an
,express assignment of this covenant, the only difference is that the plaintiff
is now enabled to sue the prior vendor with whom his vendor dealt, whereas




of the defense but participated in and profited by the facts
which gave rise to it. What should be the result (1) when
the vendor merely had knowledge of the defense but did not par-
ticipate therein, and (2) when he had no knowledge? Under
the California decision, where the vendor is held not liable when
he had knowledge and did participate in the wrong, it is clear
that he would not be liable in either of the two cases mentioned.
Under the Michigan case, he might or might not be liable. Since
the court stressed the idea of the vendor "reaping a profit from
his own fraud" the implication is that if he had no knowledge
of the defense he would not be liable, and, possibly, that the
same result would be reached where he had knowledge of the
defense but had not participated therein.
The problem is puzzling. In favor of liability of the vendor
it can be urged that he does warrant against personal defenses
to holders against whom they are available. Consistency would
say there was no reason to free him from that liability merely
because of the fortuitous event that his vendee can recover free
from it. And again, knowledge of the defect in a chattel or
defense to a negotiable instrument, Littuvier v. Goldmax aside,
is not a requisite to implied warranty. Liability therefore should
not turn on its existence or nonexistence.
On the other hand, it can be urged that the central idea of
warranty is that it is an assumption of risk by the seller for
actual or potential damage to the buyer. If this damage is ab-
sent, there should be no warranty. The most that a buyer of
a negotiable instrument has reason to exptct is the legal obli-
gation of every prior party. If he can obtain a judgment against
them he gets all that he relied upon the seller to give him. It
could also be urged that, in the case of a remote vendor, the
policy of allowing the vendee to hold his vendor liable might
generate more law suits than would arise if the vendee held
the prior party liable directly, that party then suing his trans-
feree for the wrong.
Does the vendor warrant against personal defenses under the
Negotiable Instruments Law? To, a vendee against whom the
defense is available it might seem so for Section 65 (1) imposes
a warranty that the "instrument is in all respects what it pur-
ports to be." If this means the same as "valid and subsisting,"
or the same as the expression, "the enforceable legal obligation
of prior parties," phrases used repeatedly in the common law
cases, the result would be the same under the Negotiable In-
struments Law. This would more clearly be so were it not for
Section 65 (4). One could argue under that Section that all per-
sonal defences concerned "validity" and therefore the warranty
against them depended upon knowledge of the vendor. The
Section rather definitely controls the defense of illegality, even
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when real. It would surely cover defenses of illegality when
personal. It is only a short step from there to say that all other
personal defenses concern validity and are therefore withdrawn
from the operation of Section 65 (1) and are controlled by the
more detailed Section 65 (4). It is believed that this is the more
likely result t9 be reached, flowing, of course, from the codifi-
cation of Littauer v. Goldman. Such result presents the anomaly
of the assignor of a non-negotiable chose in action being under
a heavier responsibility to his assignee than is the vendor of
a negotiable instrument.
Warranty of Liability of Secondary Parties
Thus far, for convenience only, discussion has been only with
respect to warranties against defenses of the maker, drawer
and acceptor. A vendee may find it necessary to hold liable a
prior unqualified indorser. All that has been said heretofore
concerning defenses of the maker, drawer and acceptor apply
with equal force to the unqualified indorser. If the indorser's
indorsement is forged, the instrument is not genuine, as to him.
If he has indorsed with qualification, and the qualifying words
are wrongfully erased, there has been a material alteration.
Again the instrument is not genuine, as to him. So also if the
indorser is under contractual disability. And so on through
all the defenses. In short, whenever a vendee can hold his ven-
dor liable because the maker, drawer or acceptor possessed some
defense, the vendor .can be held liable because a prior indorser
had such defense. To the extent that a vendor warrants against
defenses at all, he warrants against the defenses of all prior
parties.92
While the Negotiable Instruments Law is not as clear on this
point as it should be, enough is there said, it is believed, to jus-
tify the same statement under its provisions. For example, Sec-
tion 65(3) imposes the warranty that "all prior parties had
capacity to contract." This very clearly includes indorsers as
well as the maker, drawer and acceptor. It is inconceivable that
one whose indorsement was forged could be held liable. Since
there is a warranty against incapacity of indorsers, it must be
that Section 65(1) applies with equal force to indorsers. A
92 Lobdell v. Baker, supra note 43. The court said: "When therefore,
a man . . . puts into circulation a note, bearing the name of a blank
indorser, with nothing to rebut the natural inference to be drawn from it,
he by necessary implication affirms that the indorser is a person capable
of indorsing." 3 Mete. at 471. An indorser without recourse warrants
against defenses possessed by prior indorsers. Hoover v. Purse], supra
note 82. In this case the only solvent indorser had been released by the




forged indorsement would present a case of a non-genuine in-
strument as regards this indorser, against which the Section
imposes the warranty. So under the Statute, whenever a ven-
dor warrants against defenses of the maker, drawer and
.acceptor, he will likewise warrant against these same defenses
of an unqualified indorser.
Warranty Agaimnst Outstanding Eqzdties of Ownership
Existence of defenses by prior parties is but one of the reasons
for the failure of the transferee to collect. The transferee may
fail to recover from prior pa-ties because the transferor did
not have title. In an early Pennsylvania case, where it was
strongly argued that there should be no implied warranty of
title, the court replied that there was as much reason for a
warranty of title as there was for a warranty that the maker's
name was not forged.93 This argument, the court said, would
force the transferee to pay for what was nothing more than
"waste paper." "I also hold," concluded Yeates, J., "that if such
bill or note purports to bear the signature of certain persons,
who are responsible therefor, or through whom the buyer must
necessarily derive his title, and these signatures are afterwards
falsified by the fact, whereby injury or damage arise to the
purchaser, the seller becomes answerable therefor." 11 Numer-
ous cases support the rule that a vendor warrants that he has
title. To put it otherwise, there is a warranty against forged
indorsements of indorsees whose indorsement is essential to a
transfer of title.93
No cases have been found which raise the question whether
there is a warranty against outstanding equities of ownership
when the transferor had what might be called a voidable legal
title, or the title of an express or constructive trustee. If the
transferee is a holder in due course the equity is cut off, and
the question as to whether there is a warranty would be pre-
cisely the same as that previously raised, i.e., is there a war-
93Richie v. Sunmm, 3 Yeates 531 (Pa. 1830). Accord: Summers v.
Coates, 14 Pa. 530 (1803) (indorser without recourse).
9-43 Yeates at 542.
95 Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23 (1857), where the matter was considered
at some length, analogies to the sale of chattels being employed. Cluseau
v. Wagner, 126 La. 375, 52 So. 547 (1910); Cabot Bank v. Morton, 4 Gray
156 (Mass. 1855); Whitney v. National Bank of Potsdam, 45 N. Y. 303
(1871); Dumont v. Williamson, 18 Ohio St. 515 (18G9) (indorser without
recourse); First National Bank of Mount Vernon v. First National Bank
of Lincoln, 68 Ohio St. 43, 67 N. E. 91 (1903); Ledwich v. McKim, 53
N. Y. 307 (1873); Aldrich v. Jackson, 5 R. I. 218 (1858) (transferor by
delivery); Strange v. Ellison, 2 Bailey 385 (S. C. 1831); Hall v. Latimer
& Son, 81 S. C. 90, 61 S. E. 1057 (1908) (indorser without recourse);
Allen v. Clark, 49 Vt. 390 (1877).
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ranty against personal defenses to a holder in due course? If
the transferee is not a holder in due course because he has
knowledge of the outstanding equity, there would be no warranty
in any event because it would be deemed destroyed by implica-
tion. If he were a donee the result would be the same. If
he were not a holder in due course because he took after ma-
turity, it would have to be decided first whether he took free
from the equity even though he was not a holder in due course.
It is not proposed to retrace here the ground covered by Pro-
fessor Chafee in his article on overdue paper.0 Suffice it to
say that under some facts the purchaser after maturity takes free
from the outstanding equity and in others he does not. Where
the transferee does take free we have the same question As
that just mentioned. Where the transferee takes subject to
the equity there should be a warranty on analogy to the cases
which impose a warranty against personal defenses to a trans-
feree who takes subject to them. In both cases he fails to
collect, in the one case because of a superior equity of defense,
in the other because of a superior equity of ownership. His
rights should be the same in both cases. Against this solution
it could be argued that, having taken after maturity, the trans-
feree must be deemed to have notice of the equity, at least of
its possibility, but Professor Chafee's argument to the contrary
on this point seems stronger.
The Negotiable Instruments Law enacts in Section 65(2)
that "every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by
a qualified indorsement warrants that he has a good title to
it." This Section clearly codifies the common law rule, thus
imposing a warranty against prior forged indorsements of in-
dorsees whose indorsements were essential to a transfer of
title.
Where the transferor had a voidable title or a trustee's title,
the question whether there is a warranty against it should be
solved the same as at common law. The nature of the prob-
lem when the transferee takes free from the equity has been
stated. Where he takes subject to the equity there should be
a warranty under the Act. Under Section 65(1) he warrants
that the instrument is "in all respects what it purports to be."
If this clause read that the vendor warranted "that the instru-
ment was valid and subsisting" or that "the instrument is the
enforceable legal obligation of the parties whose names ap-
pear thereon," there could be very little doubt but that there
was such a warranty. But in the common law cases these
three phrases were used with the same meaning. An instru-
ment, therefore, purports to be an enforceable obligation. The
warranty in Section 65(2) that the vendor "has a good title
96 Op. cit. supra note 1.
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to it," should mean a title good as against all parties. The
transfer of a voidable title, therefore, would not be a compli-
ance with the warranty. Section 65(4) perhaps contains an
implication contrary. If all personal defenses and equities of
ownership were regarded as having to do with "validity," then
the requirement of this Section that the vendor have knowl-
edge of the invalidity, would modify the above argument
accordingly.
Sale, of the Instrument as Distingzdshed frovm Transfcr
in Payment of Debts
An instrument may be transferred in "payment" of an ante-
cedent or contemporaneous debt. When so transferred it will
usually be received in "payment." But the instrument may also
be transferred by one who thinks of himself as a "seller," and
received by one who conceives of himself as a "purchaser."
Normally, one "sells" goods and receives negotiable instruments
in "payment." One "buys" drafts and bonds, the transferor
thinking of himself as a "seller." Sometimes one terminology
will be adopted and sometimes another. Should the liability of
a transferor in "payment" of his obligation be any different
from that of a transferor who "sells"? If so what should be
the test for determining whether an instrument is transferred
in "payment" or transferred as a "sale"?
It has been held in some cases that there is a difference. The
Massachusetts court took this position in Ellis v. Wild 7 in
1810. A transferor of goods, who had received in exchange a
note of a third party without the indorsement of the trans-
feror, could not collect from the maker because the note bore
a forged indorsement. The court held that the transferor of
the goods could not recover from the transferor of the note:
"If it was the original intent of the defendant to sell and of
the plaintiff to buy, the notes, and to make payment in rum,
the defendant has fulfilled his contract and the plaintiff cannot
maintain this action. But if the plaintiff intended to sell the
rum for money and the defendant intended to buy rum, and
the payment by the notes was not a part of the original stipula-
tion, but an accommodation to the defendant, then he has not
paid for the rum, and the action is maintainable. Were we to
decide on the intent from the words of the report, we must
conclude the intent of the plaintiff to have been to deliver rum
in payment for the notes; and therefore the verdict [for plain-
tiff] must be set aside." 91
Similarly, in Harley v. Thornton, the South Carolina court in
1833 held:




"If such note or bill be paid in satisfaction of a previous debt,
or if it be paid in the ordinary course of business for a debt
contracted at the time, as for goods sold, and it turns out to
be bad, the person receiving it, may resort to, and recover on,
the original cause of action. If the note, however, be sold or
discontinued [discounted] . . . there can be no recourse [by
the transferee] if it prove bad." 9
In Brumby v., Dugcn'010 this court added that the reason for
this distinction is that when there is a previous debt, or one
contracted for at the time, there is a distinct cause of action,
but when the bill is sold there is no cause of action. The dis-
tinction was not upheld in Semmes v. Wilson,1 but in 1849
Ellis v. Wild was followed by Maine in Baxter v. Duren.0 2 And
Baxter v. Duren was relied upon by the Maryland court in
1858, in Fisher v. Rieman.203 Two Illinois cases leave the point
in doubt.104
In Merriam v. Wolcott 0 " the Massachusetts court repudiated
the distinction taken in its earlier case of Ellis v. Wild and by
the Maine court in Baxter v. Duren, saying:
"It is difficult to see any valid reason for such distinction.
Whether the purchaser pays cash or discharges a debt in pay-
ment for the forged paper the injury is the same to him. There
99 The transferor of a bank bill of an insolvent bank was held liable.
The case is reported as a note to Brumby v. Dugan, 2 Hill 508, 510 (S. C.
1834). The court drew the implication from Owenson v. Morse, 7 T. R. 64
(1796), Ex parte Blackburn, 10 Ves. 204 (1804), and Puckford v. Maxwell,
6 T. R. 52 (1794).
100 Supra note 99, where the transferor of the note of an insolvent third
party was held not liable to the transferee as the note had been "sold"
to him.
101 Supra note 2.
102 29 Me. 434, holding that there was an implied warranty of genuine-
ness when the instrument was transferred in "payment" of a debt, either
precedent or contemporaneous. But where "the paper is sold . . .there is
... no implied warranty of the genuineness. The law respecting the sale
of goods-is applicable. The only implied warranty is, that the seller owns
or is lawfully entitled to dispose of the paper." 29 Me. at 441. The court
purported to follow the early English cases. The defendant was an un-
disclosed principal of the seller, a broker, who being thus held not liable,
was a competent witness in an action by the transferee against the prin-
cipal.
103 12 Md. 497. This was also a case where the transferee of a note,
bearing the forged signature of the maker and an indorser, sued a public
broker, who had not disclosed his principal, Held: plaintiff could not
recover.
104 Hinckley v. Kersting, 21 Ill. 247 (1859), is another case of what
seems to have been a purchase of a counterfeit bill from a broker. But
Tyler v. Bailey, 71 Ill. 34 (1873), is apparently contra.
105 3 Allen 258 (Mass. 1861.) The purchaser of a forged note recovers
from the broker who sold it. Cabot Bank v. Morton, &upra note 95.
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is in both cases a failure of consideration growing out of a
mistake of facts." 106
The court thought that its earlier decision in Cabot Ba.nlk V.
Morton,107 although not mentioning Ellis v. Wild, was contradic-
tory to it. The Ohio court has likewise disapproved of the
distinction taken in Ellis v. Wild and Baxter v. Dnjre Cn s Sim-
ilarly, in Hussey v. Sibley,7°9 the laine court remarked "that
the distinction . . . is, to say the least, somewhat shadowy."
But this later laine case on its facts and decision is not incon-
sistent with the earlier holding in Baxter v. Duren. And in
1883, the laine court, in Milliken v. Chapman,10 said:
"Counsel are in error in supposing that Baxter v. Durcn was
overruled in Hussey v. Sibley .... The court still maintains
the distinction asserted in Baxter v. Duren between negotiable
paper transferred without indorsement in payment of a debt
due or then contracted, and transactions where the paper is
sold or bartered as other goods and effects are. .... Cases in
which the note is simply transferred in payment of a debt...
afford no rule for cases of sale. The creditor .. very prop-
erly ... is not required ... to assume any risk.. .. Not so
with a sale, in which the price is affected by the risk ...
What we mean to hold is that he who . . . sells negotiable
paper... without indorsing it, or making any false representa-
tions respecting the solvency of the makers, warrants nothing
as to their condition in that respect. . . .The court that ig-
nores as too shadowy, the distinction between paying a debt in
failed paper and selling the same in good faith for what the
buyer is willing to give will inevitably find itself involved in
ascertaining the still more shadowy difference it makes to the
purchaser of paper that has a month to run, whether the maker
fails on the day of its purchase, or the day before or the day
after." 1
And elsewhere the court argued:
"It would seem to be an anomaly to hold that although he
[an unqualified indorser] who procures a note to be discounted
with his indorsement, is chargeable with the debt only upon
due presentment, demand and notice, still one who sells it out-
right in good faith, for what it will bring without his indorse-
106 3 Allen at, 260.
107 Supro note 95.
'I" Dumont v. Williamson, 18 Ohio St. 515 (1869).
o109 66 Me. 192 (1876) (transferor of a void order in payment of an
antecedent debt liable to his transferee).
10 75 Me. 306. In this case the plaintiff sold a note to the defend-
ant at 12% discount, -which was paid for with the defendant's due bill,
here sued on. The defendant's defense of failure of consideration was not
maintainable. Held: not error to refused defendant's offered instruction





ment can be held, practically as a guarantor without demand or
notice, on the ground that he imphedly warrants that the mak-
ers are solvent at the time of the sale." 112
That is, this is advanced as a reason for not holding the trans-
feror at all when he sells the instrument.
The Minnesota court, after noting that Ellis v. Wild had been
overruled in Massachusetts but that the corresponding decision
in Maine, though first questioned, was later reaffirmed, adopted
the distinction between payments and sales and followed Bax-
ter v. Duren.123 The distinction seems also to have been rec-
ognized in Iowa.114  The District of Columbia court, however,
in Strauss v. Hensey, refused to adopt it.116
The Negotiable Instruments Law seems to make no distinc-
tion between transfers to pay debts and transfers to a pur-
chaser, for the warranties attach under Section 65 when the
instrument has been "negotiated." A negotiation, under Sec-
tion 30, is a transfer "in such manner as to constitute the trans-
feree the holder thereof." And a holder, by Section 191, is
"the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession
of it or the bearer thereof." Under these Sections it would be
difficult to find the basis for the distinction taken in the above
cases.
Variation of the Liability by Agreement
Implied warranties against any or all defenses may be nega-
tived by agreement."1 Knowledge of the facts which constitute
112 Ibid. 316.
113 Brown v. Ames, 59 Minn. 476, 61 N. W. 448 (1894) (transferee of
a note bearing a forged indorsement, sold to him by an agent for an un-
disclosed principal, could not recover from the agent, seller).
114 Dille v. White, 132 Iowa 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906). The court did
not cite the Negotiable Instruments Law.
-1 7 App. D. C. 289 (1895). Referring to Ellis v. Wild and Baxter v.
Duren, the court said: "The cases just mentioned have been virtually
overruled." 7 App. D. C. at 293. The court did not refer to Milliken v.
Chapman.
116 Strauss v. Hensey, supra note 115; Bell v. Dagg, 60 N. Y. 528 (1875);
Beal v. Roberts, 113 Mass. 525 (1873) ; Porter v. Bright, 82 Pa. 441 (1876).
In Coffman v. Allin, 16 Ky. 200 (1815), where the court found that the
assignee "agreed to take the bond at his own risk without recourse in any
event," it was held that such indorser was not liable to his transferee, the
bond bearing the forged signature of the obligor. While the language
here is stronger than a mere assignment without recourse, it is questionable
whether it should have been interpreted so as to negative the warranty
against forgery. Similarly in O'Sullivan v. Griffith, 153 Cal. 502, 95 Pac.
873 (1908), the assignment being of "all the transferor's right, title and
interest in and to said franchise," the assignor was held not liable although
he had no title. This may be because the transaction related to land. The
court said: "the franchises were not personal property... and the decisions
relating to warranties implied from the sale of personalty have no applica-
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a defense to a prior party, possessed by the vendee of the in-
strument at the time of the transfer, also operates as a destruc-
tion by implication of the implied warranty of the vendor
against this particular defense.- 7  The question may turn on
how much the vendee knows. If he knows all the facts and
these facts constitute a defense he cannot resort to his vendor.
If he knows some of the facts, but not all, the question becomes
more difficult.1
Implied warranties will be negatived if the vendee knows the
vendor is selling as an agent for a disclosed principal. An
agency is not disclosed merely by making known his principal's
name and declaring that he is his agent. It may be that the
agent, despite these disclosures, is not then selling as agent for
the principal named. The buyer may be purchasing solely on
the credit of the agent. Hence the rule requiring disclosure of
an agency means the disclosure of the fact that the agent is so
tion." In Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N. Y. 487 (1868), a stipulation by
a transferor of an infant's note, the transferor being ignorant of the in-
fancy, that the note so transferred "was the maker's genuine note and not
further or otherwise," was held to negative the warranty of capacity. The
court said that there could have been rescission on the ground of mutual
mistake of material fact, i.e., the lack of capacity of the maker, but that
this right had been lost by unreasonable delay-eight months. Sed quacra?
One judge regretted the decision because he thought the implied warranty
had not been negatived.
17A transferee with knowledge of the defense that a note is void be-
cause illegal cannot recover from his indorser without recourse. Triplett
v. Holly, 14 Ky. 130 (1823); Dakin v. Anderson, 18 Ind. 52 (1862) (bank
bills illegally issued). Accord: Lutz v. Matheny, 208 Ill. App. 40 (191?)
(gambling note); Frost v. Martin, 29 N. H. 306 (1854) (partial payment);
Turner v. Keller, 66 N. Y. 66 (1876) (maker's name was signed by one
without authority); Redden v. Bank, 66 Kan. 747, 71 Pac. 578 (1903)
(note discharged by novation into a judgment); Ober v. Goodridge, 27
Gratt. 878 (Va. 1876) (knowledge that prior unqualified indorser dis-
charged by failure to give due notice of dishonor) ; Freeman v. Guyer, 13
Ill. 652 (1852) (amount due was less than that called for by note). In
Moody v. Morris-Roberts Co., 38 Idaho 414, 226 Pac. 278 (1923), under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, two of the judges thought that knowledge
of the defense destroyed the warranty.
'-With respect to the assignment of a bond for deed, the mere knowl-
edge of the assignee that a claim of title was made by a third party did
not of itself shift this risk from the assignor to the assignee. Emmerson
v. Claywell, supra note 84.
19 Agent not liable to the purchaser. Ex parte Bird, 4 DeG. & S. 271
(1851); Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487 (1868); Hutson v. Tyler, 140
Mo. 252, 41 S. W. 795 (1897) ; Strauss v. Hensey, supra. note 115. If the
agent does not disclose his principal he is liable on the implied warranties
to the vendee. Baxter v. Duren, supra note 102; Parlange v. Faures, 14 La.
Ann. 448 (1859); Sere v. Faures, 15 La. Ann. 189 (1860); Pugh v. Moore,
Hymans & Co., s=pro, note 59; Hunt v. Sanders, supra note 3; Lyons v.
Miller, supra note 2.
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acting in the particular transaction. 120
If implied warranties may be destroyed by agreement, ex-
press warranties may be annexed to the transfer.12' Moreover,
such facts do not destroy the warranties implied in the transac-
tion.122  The parol evidence rule furnishes no difficulty when
express warranties are entered into by a transferor by delivery.
Nor should it furnish any difficulty in cases of transfers by
qualified indorsement, because the liability of the vendor is not
predicated upon on this so called indorsement at all but is im-
posed upon him simply because he transferred the instrument.
There is no contract in writing that could be varied by parol
evidence. And courts have so held,123 although the contrary has
120 Lyons v. Miller, supra note 2, where the court said: "Nor is it
material whether the person making the transfer receives the consider-
ation ... for the use of another; unless he is acting as an agent and dis-
closes not only his agency, but the nume of the principal for whom he is
acting; in which case he is not a party to the contract, the contract being
made with his principal through his agency." 47 Va. at 440. Accord:
Cabot Bank v. Morton, supra note 95; M. N. Bank v. Gallaudet, 120 N.
Y. 298, 24 N. E. 994 (1890) ; Worthington v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 30 (1873);
Brown v. Ames, supra note 113.
121 Action against a transferor by delivery has been allowed for breach
of an oral warranty that the maker was "financially responsible." lnauss
v. Major, 111 Mich. 239, 69 N. W. 489 (1896). Accord: Prudden v. Neg-
ter, 103 Mich. 540, 61 N. W. 777 (1895); Burtch v. Child, Hulswit & Co.,
207 Mich. 205, 174 N. W. 170 (1919). Also Cabot Bank v. Morton, supra
note 95 (express warranty of solvency). Accord: Cardell v. McNiel, 21
N. Y. 336 (1860); Bruce v. Burr, 67 N. Y. 237 (1876); Kail v. Bell, supra
note 87 (express warranty not destroyed by subsequent acceptance of or-
ders indorsed without recourse).
i2 Hannum v. Richardson, 48 Vt. 508 (1875), pointing out that the proof
of express warranties does not contradict the implied warranties, and
therefore the parol evidence rule does not prevent their proof.
123 In Harton v. Scales, Minor 166 (Ala. 1823), where the declaration
charged false representation of solvency of the maker, by the indorser
without recourse, proof of such statements was admissible. In Freeman
v. Guyer, supra note 82, it was held that the implied warranty of an
indorser without recourse that the amount called for by the instrument was
due was controlled by parol agreement that the sum due was to be fixed
by the statements of two parties named by them. Compare also Buehler
v. Pierce, supra note 77 (express warranty against usury); Northrup Na-
tional Bank v. Yates Center National Bank, 98 Kan. 563, 169 Pac. 403
(1916) (parol evidence admitted to show notes indorsed without recourse
were transferred as collateral security).
Implied warranties of an indorser without recourse may be entirely
negatived by oral agreement. Carroll v. Nodine, supra note 30. It would
seem that the Oregon court takes a different view of this problem under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, for in Smith v. Barner, 95 Ore. 480,
496, 188 Pac. 216, 219 (1920), the court, after referring to Carroll
v. Nodine, said: "When it [a negotiable instrument] is transferred by
delivery only, the transaction rests in parol, and a defense in parol may
then be made. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law when such a note





1. A transferor by delivery and a qualified indorser of a negoti-
able instrument irrespective of their knowledge of the facts
warrant it to be free from all real defenses of all prior parties.
This rule remains true under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, Section 65(1) and 65(3) except that Section 65(4) in
codifying statement 1(b) below operates as a limitation thereon.
(a) There was one apparent exception, generally recognized.
Under certain circumstances in the sale of bonds of governmen-
tal bodies and of private corporations (though as to the latter
the evidence is less clear) no warranty that the bonds had been
issued in compliance with statutory provisions was held to
exist.2-
In so far as the cases where there was held to be no war-
ranty can be regarded as involving the idea of "capacity," the
rule remains the same under the last sentence of Section 65 (4).
In so far as these cases, holding no warranty involve the idea
of "validity," they will be governed by the first sentence in Sec-
tion 65 (4). Where there is knowledge of invalidity there will
be a warranty. Where there is no knowledge of invalidity there
will be no warranty. In a general way there is a codification of
Otis V. Cullum.
As regards the cases wherein it was held that there was a
warranty of compliance with statutory requirements in the sale
of public and private securities, in so far as they involve the
idea of "capacity" the rule has been changed by Section 65 (4).
In so far as those cases involve the idea of "validity"-assum-
ing a line of demarcation can be drawn between them-they
will be controlled by the first sentence of Section 65 (4), under
which the warranty will be recreated on proof of knowledge of
The statutory terms and provisions are incorporated in and made a part
thereof, and parol evidence is not admissible to e-xplain or vary the written
indorsement." There was strong dissent on this point.2A4Parol evidence of a warranty of collectibility has been held inad-
missible as against an indorser without recourse. Maxfield v. Sones, 10G
Ark. 346, 153 S. W. 584 (1913). Parol evidence has not been admitted to
vary a qualified indorsement. Heagy v. Umberger, 10 Serg. & Raw. 339
(Pa. 1823); Youngberg v, Nelson, 51 Blinn. 172, 53 N. W. 629 (1892);
Odom Realty Co. v. Central Trust Co., 22 Ga. App. 711, 97 S. E. 11G
(1918); McIIichael v. Jarvis, 78 Tex. 671, 15 S. W. 111 (1890); Fayette
National Bank v. Ingard, 34 Idaho 295, 200 Pac. 344 (1921); Harton v-
Scales, supra note 123, at 167, where the court said: 'f the action had been
on the assignment [indorsement without recourse] parol testimony ought
not to have been received."
- The distinction between these two classes of cases is not as clear
from the decisions as might be wished. The exception may be called ap-
parent on the theory that the absence of warranty is due to constructive
knowledge of the facts possessed by the transferee.
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invalidity by the transferor. In short, the general object was to
change the rule in Meyer v. Riehards, and to permit the prin-
ciple of Otis v. Cullum to control the field.
(b) In New York, under the decision of Littatuer v. Goldman,
contrary to the common law rule in England and America gen-
erally, there was no warranty that the instrument was free from
usury, unless the transferor had knowledge of such fact. This
decision might be generalized into the wider proposition that
there was no warranty against the real defense of illegality ex-
cept upon proof of knowledge by the transferor. This rule has
been codified by the first sentence of Section 65 (4).
2. The cases also show that the transferor by delivery and
the qualified indorser of a negotiable instrument irrespective of
knowledge warrant it to be free from personal defenses, at least
to a transferee who was subject to such defense. The state-
ment in 1 (a) could also be regarded as an apparent exception
to this rule and the statement in 1 (b) constituted a real excep-
tion in New York. The rule has been changed by the first
sentence of Section 65(4) which requires knowledge of the de-
fense as a prerequisite to the warranty. This conclusion in-
volves the assumption that all personal defenses concern "valid-
ity." While the conclusion is not free from doubt, personal
defenses seem to fit better into the language of Section 65(4)
than they do in 65(1) and 65 (3).
3. The transferor by delivery and the qualified indorser of a
negotiable instrument irrespective of knowledge also warrant
that the instrument is free from all outstanding legal and equi-
table claims of ownership, which could be successfully asserted
against the transferee. This is commonly called the' warranty
of title. This rule is codified by Section 65 (2).
Where the transferee takes free from the claim of ownership
the problem is that stated in (5) below. The Negotiable Instru-
ments Law does not expressly deal with this problem. The
conflict and uncertainty there indicated could continue under
the Act.
4. Statements (1), (2) and (3) can be combined into the
single proposition that, at common law, the transferor by de-
livery and the qualified indorser of a negotiable instrument irre-
spective of knowledge of the facts warrant that it is an enforce-
able legal obligation against all prior parties. That is, there is
a warranty of the existence of such facts as will enable the
transferee to obtain a judgment against all prior parties, in the
event of dishonor, if the necessary proceedings on dishonor
are duly taken by the transferee. This remains true under the
Act except to the extent that the first sentence of Section 65 (4)
,operates as a limitation thereon.
5. There is doubt as to whether the transferor by delivery
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and the qualified indorser warrant the instrument to be free
from personal defenses and claims of ownership to a holder in
due course, who, obviously, could recover free from them.
(a) Where the vendor had knowledge of the defense and
participated in the fraud, a Michigan case has held that such
fraudulent payee warranted to his transferee, a holder in due
course. A California case, on substantially the same facts, held
that because the, transferee was not subject to the defense, being
a holder in due course, there was no warranty.
(b) No cases have been found where the vendor merely had
knowledge of the defense or equity but had not profited by the
facts which gave rise to them.
(c) Nor have any cases been found where the vendor had
no knowledge of the defense or outstanding equity of ownership.
Under the California decision there would obviously be no
warranty in cases (b) and (c). Under the Mlichigan decision,
there might be a warranty in case (b) but probably not in case
(c). As the Negotiable Instruments Law does not deal with
this problem expressly, the same conflict and uncertainty could
continue under the Act.
6. All implied warranties could be negatived by the express
or implied agreement of the parties. While this rule is not ex-
pressly incorporated in the Act, it should still be true by virtue
of Section 196.
(a) Under some authorities implied warranties were deemed
negatived by a transfer by way of sale as distinguished from
a transfer in satisfaction of a prior or contemporaneous obliga-
tion. Most cases held otherwise, finding no difference between
transfers by way of sale and transfers in payment of debts.
The Act, by applying to all "negotiations," impliedly changes
the minority rule.
(b) Knowledge of the facts which constitute the defense or
equity, possessed by the transferee at the time of transfer, oper-
ate to destroy the implied warranty. While this rule is not ex-
pressly incorporated, it should be true under the Act, by virtue
of Section 196.
(c) Implied warranties will be negatived if the transferee
knows the transferor by delivery is acting as the agent for a
principal whose name is disclosed to him. This rule is codified
by Section 69.
7. Express warranties may be annexed to the transfer by
agreement of the parties.
As regards the indorsement without recourse some cases take
the view that this is a contract in writing and therefore cannot
be added to or substracted from by parol. The prevailing rule
is that it is not a contract in writing and therefore subject to
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variation by parol. The Negotiable Instruments Law not deal-
ing with this problem, the conflict could continue.
8. Apparently, at common law, warranties attached to the
transfer by delivery of an instrument by one whose indorsement
was essential to a transfer of title. Section 65 imposes war-
ranties on "every person negotiating." This could be construed
as destroying all warranties of the transferor by delivery who
was payee of order paper or of a special indorsee whose indorse-
ment was essential to a negotiation. It would seem more rea-
sonable, however, to give the term "negotiating" a wider mean-
ing such as has been done in those cases which hold that a
payee may be a holder in due course.
